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ABSTRACT

Mixed incentive compensation structures have been widely studied in the
accounting literature (e.g., Tian et al. 2017; Dekker et al. 2012, Rothenberg 2011; Hwang
et al. 2009). However, the findings in the literature as to the effectiveness of mixed
incentives are not consistent. The inconsistency in the mixed incentives literature may be
due to the various levels of social dilemma embedded in the research setting of the
studies. Therefore, I experimentally investigated two factors that may reduce the
embedded social dilemma issue and improve the effectiveness of mixed incentive
compensation. In this study, student participants were assigned to pairs to complete a
computerized letter-decoding task in which I manipulated (1) pair budget goal difficulty
(easy vs. difficult) and (2) pair identity (strong vs. weak). I found that when given a
difficult pair budget goal, pair members cooperated more and sabotaged less than when
given an easy pair budget goal. Furthermore, I found that assigned a difficult goal,
participants in highly identified pairs sabotaged less than those in weakly identified pairs.
However, this difference was not found in the easy goal condition. Also, I found that
when the goal was easy, strong pair identity enhanced productivity through inducing
additional participant effort. When the goal was difficult, strong pair identity enhanced
productivity through the suppression of sabotage. The results have implications for
understanding individuals’ strategic behaviors when they face conflicts of interest and
provide practical insights for the design of mixed incentive compensation systems.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Teamwork is increasingly seen as an important factor for business success
(Mueller, Procter, and Buchanan 2000; Cohen and Bailey 1997). For example, in his
article published in The Economist in 2016, Schumpeter argues that teams “have become
the basic building-blocks of organisations.” In addition, in a survey conducted in 2013,
EY (Ernst & Young) report that about 90% of the respondents agree that teams are
essential to provide effective solutions for the problems companies currently face.
However, applying proper incentives for teams appears to be one of the most
challenging tasks for many companies (Irlenbusch and Ruchala 2008; Hamilton,
Nickerson, and Owan 2003; DeMatteo, Eby, and Sundstrom 1998; Main, O’Reilly, and
Wade 1993). In general, team members are often rewarded based on the team’s output
and not individual contributions because absolute individual contributions cannot be
easily measured or are often difficult to verify (Irlenbusch and Ruchala 2008)1. However,
this compensation scheme introduces an opportunity to free ride, which leads to
suboptimal effort levels. Individual-based compensation can solve such issues because
they often motivate competition. However, competition not only motivates employees
invest more effort but could also create sabotage issues. Therefore, providing
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In this study, I used individual relative information for performance evaluation instead of absolute
individual performance.
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a mixed-incentives scheme which contains both an element of group-based
compensations and individual-based compensations is considered an effective way to
align employees’ interest with the interest of the organization.
Mixed incentive structures can alleviate issues arising from individual- or teambased compensation structures because the issues of one type of incentive are neutralized
by the aspects of the other type of the incentives (Welbourne and Mejia 1995). As such,
the mixed incentive scheme is commonly used in practice. For example, Lawler et al.
(2003) report that the percentage of companies using mixed incentives increased by 29
percent from 1990 to 2002. However, evidence on the effect of the mixed incentive
structure is mixed. For example, Kozlowski and Ilgen (2006) document a positive effect
of mixed incentives on motivating effort and increasing output. Other studies, however,
show that mixed incentives lead to subprime output levels through increased competition
and less cooperation when teamwork is essential (Libby and Thorne 2009; Irlenbusch and
Ruchala 2008; Quigley et al. 2007). The inconsistent findings in prior research may be
due to social dilemmas embedded their research settings. For example, the mixed
incentive in Pearsall et al. (2010) motivates participants to compete with individuals in
other groups and cooperate within one’s own group. In Blazovich (2013), piece rate pay
is used for both group and individual compensation in a mixed incentives setting. Thus,
the two incentives motivate participants to invest effort in the same direction and toward
the same ends. Therefore, the social dilemma issue is trivial in such settings because there
are no conflicts of interest. However, in many other study (e.g., Tian et al. 2017; Libby
and Thorne 2009; Irlenbusch and Ruchala 2008), the mixed incentives in the settings
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create various levels of social dilemmas where participants face a tension between
allocating effort for individual interests or group interests.
In this study, I investigate two factors to reduce the social dilemma issues present
in mixed incentives environments. The formal research questions are how pair budget
goal difficulty and pair identity affect individual decision-making and performance in a
mixed incentives compensation scheme environment.
The goal setting literature documents a positive relation between goal difficulty
and individual effort and performance (Hirst and Lowy 1990; Hirst 1987; Locke et al.
1981). However, the effect of goal setting on performance arrives differently at the
individual level and the group level. Unlike in the individual setting where goals induce
effort and persistence, in the group setting, the role of task strategy development is
critical in that groups face a constant need for cooperation due to the nature of
interdependence embedded in group tasks (Van Mierlo and Kleingeld 2010; Kozlowski
and Bell 2003). In addition, goal difficulty affects individuals’ risk-taking preference.
When they perceive the group goal as difficult to achieve, I expect them to choose a low
risk strategy to ensure goal achievement (e.g., cooperating more and sabotaging less). As
such, I hypothesize that there will be more cooperation and less sabotage when the pair
budget goal is difficult than when is easy.2
Group Identity, an informal internal control mechanism, can affect individual
behaviors. Organizations often attemot to enhance group identity to foster cooperation
among group members (Liu 2016). Prior literature also finds that enhancing group
identity has a positive effect on employees’ cooperative behavior and performance

The term “pair” is used in this study. A pair is a special case of groups where a pair consists of only two
members.
2
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(Ellemers, De Gilders, Haslam 2004; Towry 2003; King 2002; De Cremer and van Dijk
2002; Kramer and Brewer 1984). Such relation is achieved through a self-categorization
process. Through this process people perceive themselves as the representatives of the
group rather than unique individuals. Therefore, people should perform in a way
benefiting the group. In addition, high group identity increases the concern for others in a
group, and this concern reduces competitiveness among group members. As such, I
predict that participants will sabotage less when pair identity is strong than when pair
identity is weak.3 However, I expect this effect will only exist when pair budget goal
difficulty is easy.
To eliminate or reduce the effect of other possible variables on my findings, I
investigate my research questions using an experiment in which I manipulate pair budget
goal difficulty (easy vs. difficulty) and pair identity (high vs. low). I manipulate goal
difficulty using a fixed number of budgeted pair output and manipulate pair identity using
a slogan guessing game. Specifically, participants were randomly assigned into pairs,
each of which decoded letter combinations to numbers for five rounds. Each participant
in a pair was provided with a list of numerical keys different from the ones provided to
the other participant in the pair. Each participant determined the number of keys to share
with their teammate (cooperation) and the number of the teammate’s output he/she would
like to reduce (sabotage) at the start of each round. Participants also determined whether
they would like to work extra time on the decoding task at the start of each round. They
were compensated on two performance metrics: pair performance and relative individual
performance. When a pair’s budget goal was achieved, each participant in the pair would

3

Pair Identity in the paper is equivalent to group identity in the literature.
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receive 5 U.S. dollars. In addition, the person with a higher individual output would
receive an additional 7 U.S. dollars as an individual bonus. The person with a lower
individual output would receive an additional 3 U.S. dollars as an individual bonus.
When the pair budget goal was not achieved, both participants in the pair earned zero
U.S. dollars.
The results show that participants who were assigned difficult pair budget goals
shared more of their keys than those who were assigned easy pair budget goals. That is,
participants were working more closely with each other when the pair goal was difficult.
In addition, participants sabotaged less when assigned a difficult pair budget goal than
when assigned an easy pair budget goal. Further, pair budget goal difficulty is positively
associated with productivity. That is, when assigned difficult pair budget goals,
participants decoded more combinations.
I also find a main effect for pair identity on sabotage. Specifically, participants in
the strong pair identity condition sabotaged less than those in the weak pair identity
condition. However, the main effect of pair identity on sabotage appears to be driven by
the pair identity effect on sabotage in the difficult pair budget goal condition. That is, the
relation between pair identity and sabotage is significant in the difficult pair budget goal
condition but not in the easy pair budget goal condition. When assigned a difficult pair
budget goal, participants in highly identified pairs sabotaged each other less than those in
weakly identified pairs. The relation between pair identity and cooperation is not
significant.
Moreover, I find that pair identity has a significant effect on pair effort.
Specifically, highly identified pairs worked longer than weakly identified pairs on the
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decoding task. I also find that pair identity is positively associated with productivity when
pair budget goals are easy. However, the relation between pair identity and productivity
is not significant when pair budget goals are difficult.
Finally, I test the causality between pair identity and productivity. The results
indicate that the positive effect of pair identity on productivity was obtained through
different mechanisms in the easy pair budget goal condition than in the difficult pair
budget goal condition. Specifically, in the easy pair budget goal condition, participants in
highly identified pairs worked longer to increase productivity. Whereas, in the difficult
pair budget goal condition, participants in highly identified pairs increased productivity
by reducing sabotage activity.
This study makes the following contributions. First, a large body of literature has
focused on the use of incentives to motivate employee effort and performance in team
settings. This study contributes to this stream of literature by providing evidence that the
effectiveness of incentives depends on both economic and psychological factors.
Specifically, when individuals face conflicts of interest, pair budget goal difficulty and
the strength of pair identity play an important role in aligning individual interests with the
interests of an organization.
Second, this study contributes to the goal setting literature by investigating goal
difficulty at the pair level. Prior goal setting literature has focused on the effect of
individual goal difficulty on effort and performance. The studies on goal setting at the
group level have ignored the effect of goal difficulty on individual strategic behavior
when group members face conflicts of interest. This research adds to the literature by
providing evidence that when a difficult pair budget goal is provided, the pair goal
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becomes more important than the individual goal. Therefore, group members behave
cooperatively to achieve the pair goal.
Third, this study extends the group identity literature by examining the effect of
group identity on cooperation and sabotage. Prior literature shows that individuals in a
highly identified group value their group more than other groups. Individuals in a highly
identified group have concern for other group members and behave cooperatively.
However, the literature overlooks the detrimental effect of social dilemmas. That is, it is
not clear that when group members face conflicts of interest whether strong group
identity can induce cooperation or sabotage activity within the group. This study adds to
the literature by showing when group identity is effective in motiving cooperative
behavior in a group.
Finally, a body of research shows that providing mixed incentives which include
both group-based incentives and individual, tournament incentives can, first, reduce the
free-riding issue embedded in group-based incentives and, second, enhance
competitiveness within groups. This study shows that the effectiveness of mixed
incentives depends on other factors. Hence, organizations planning to use mixed
incentives to maximize the effectiveness of group work may use them with caution
because using mixed incentives alone may cause detrimental effect to the organizations.
This study shows that enhanced group identity or setting a difficult group budget goal
shifts focus from individual interests to group interests.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a
review of the relevant literature. Chapter 3 develops the hypotheses. Chapter 4 describes
the research methodology used to test the hypotheses. Chapter 5 discusses the results of
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the data analysis. Chapter 6 specifies the conclusion, limitations, and future research.
Reference and appendices are provided thereafter.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, I review the literature on performance-based incentives and
discuss the issues related to these incentives.

Performance-based Compensation

Group-based Compensation,
Motivation, and the Issue of Free-riding
Current research increasingly underscores the value of teams for business success
as organizations use more and more teams as central work units (DeMatteo et al. 1998;
Cohen and Bailey 1997; Guzzo and Dickson 1996). For example, Lawler, Mohrman, and
Ledford (1995) report that 68% of Fortune 1000 companies used work teams in 1993
compared to 28% in 1987. Work teams are groups of individuals who work
interdependently and are mutually responsible for group outcomes (Kirkman and Shapiro
2000). Because of the increased use of teams, organizations need to consider how to
compensate employees in a group environment (DeMatteo et al. 1998). In a group
environment, individual performance is not easy to measure. Therefore, rewarding agents
based on absolute individual outcomes is not appropriate (Zingheim and Schuster 1997)

9
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and may be costly in such settings.4 Hence, group-based compensation is usually deemed
an effective incentive strategy for teamwork.
According to DeMatteo et al. (1998), the popularity of using group-based
compensation in modern organizations is attributed to the following factors. First is a
change in the nature of many jobs. To adapt to the demand of development and growth
and to enhance the competitiveness in the market in the modern economy, organizations
have changed the way work is organized such that lots of companies have changed their
organizational structure from a vertical hierarchy to a horizontal hierarchy (i.e. a flat
organizational structure). On the one hand, this flattened structure promotes employee
involvement in decision-making. On the other hand, it changes jobs to be more and more
interdependent. For example, in a manufacturing plant, assembly workers’ performance
is partially affected by the performance of materials purchasing department and/or the
performance of a machine maintenance team. Using a medical group sample, Pizzini
(2010) empirically shows that the degree of task interdependence is positively associated
with the probability of group-based compensation incentives. Specifically, physicians
who were involved in more task interdependent specialties were more likely to use
group-based compensation incentives.
Second is the demand for cooperation within an organization. Since several jobs
within an organization are interdependent, agents need to cooperate with each other to
complete tasks and achieve the ultimate organizational goals. An incentive system is one
of the effective strategies companies use to shape employees’ behavior and align

4

In this study, I examine a mixed incentives scheme which contains both a group-based incentive and a
tournament incentive. Tournament incentives are different from individual incentives based on absolute
individual performance in that tournament incentives compensate individuals based on their relative
performance to each other. It is less costly than absolute individual incentives and easier to measure.
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employee actions with organizational goals. Unlike individual rewards, which are
intended to motivate and enhance individual effort and performance and sometimes
encourage competition among employees, group-based compensation has been shown to
motivate cooperation among employees. For example, Hwang, Erkens, and Evans (2009)
find that when the value of sharing knowledge increases, the probability of firms’
implementing group-based compensation in their sample of manufacturing companies
increases. Although Hwang et al. (2009) do not examine the relation between groupbased compensation and cooperation, their study suggests that group-based compensation
motivates cooperation which enhances knowledge sharing among employees. Such
cooperative behavior is believed to smooth organizational operations and ultimately
enhance organizational effectiveness (Geber 1995; Tiosvold 1986). In fact, research has
documented the positive correlation between group-based compensation and cooperation
among group members (Wageman 1995).
In an experimental study, Beersma et al. (2003) measure performance as speed
and accuracy. They find that group-based rewards enhance accuracy while individualbased rewards enhance speed. In their setting, accuracy is driven by task-relevant
knowledge. To increase accuracy, team members who had more knowledge shared
information with team members with relatively less knowledge. Using this shared
knowledge, the team members can perform higher quality work than otherwise. Hence,
their finding shows that group-based rewards enhance cooperation among team members.
Moreover, they show that such performance improvement is realized through enhancing
the accuracy of the teams’ poorest performers.
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Using complementary theory, Drake et al. (1999) provide evidence that groupbased compensation induces cooperation among team members in an experimental
setting where participants were asked to assemble products using LEGOTM blocks.
Cooperative innovation was measured in the experiment as the agreement between team
members to preassemble parts for each other and the number of workers who were
involved in changing work orders to facilitate team members’ assembling work. Their
results show that participants engaged in more cooperation innovation in the group-based
compensation condition than in the individual tournament condition. They also find that
such cooperation is likely to save costs and avoid excess inventory.
Extending the literature, Bamberger and Levi (2009) experimentally examine the
effect of incentive structure on helping, a prosocial behavior partially based on
consideration and cooperation (Dyne and LePine 1998). They find that the greater the
extent to which group-based pay is allocated on individual relative performance, the less
the amount of requests for help to which participants agreed. Specifically, the level of
helpful responses are significantly lower in the equity condition than in the equality
condition5. However, the level of response for requests for help is not significantly
different between the equality condition and the mixed condition. Furthermore, they
provide evidence that in the equality condition and the mixed condition, participants
provided significantly more self-directed help than in the equity condition. However,
such differences were not observed between the equality condition and the mixed

5

They used a 3 by 2 experiment in which compensation was manipulated at three levels. In the equity
condition which was a tournament incentive rewards were based on participants’ relative performance to
others in the group. In the equality condition which was a group-based incentive rewards were equally
divided among all group members. In the mixed condition, a part of the rewards was allocated based on
individual relative performance to others’ in the group and the other part of the rewards were equally
divided among all group members.
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condition. Additionally, they document that the effect of reward allocation on help is
moderated by incentive intensity. That is, under conditions of high incentive intensity,
participants provided more help in the equality condition and the mixed condition than in
the equity condition. And yet such difference is not found in the condition of low
incentive intensity.
Libby and Thorne (2009) find that in a team production environment, participants
assembled more products in the group incentive condition than in the individual incentive
condition or the mixed incentives condition. Similarly, using the data obtained from a
Fortune 500 company’s manufacturing plant, Román (2009) finds that providing plant
incentive bonuses for meeting quarterly plant goals increased productivity and also
enhanced production quality. Particularly, he shows that the productivity increased and
the product defection rate declined after adopting the new incentive plan.
Theory suggests that group-based incentives induce more effort than individual
incentives (Devine et al. 1999; Fisher 1994) because group-based incentives promote
information sharing among team members (Fisher et al. 2008). Such effort then results in
higher group performance (Libby and Thorne 2009; Che and Yoo 2001). However,
group-based incentives are not free from issues of their own. Since individual
performance is difficult to measure in a teamwork environment, it is possible that people
may try to acquire a share of team profits from others’ effort, also known as the freeriding issue. For example, using a non-real effort experiment in which group members
decided the amount of effort s/he would like to invest between their own task and
providing help to other group members, Rankin (2004) shows that when there is an
opportunity to do so, people tend to take advantage of others’ effort. He finds that when
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teammates cannot coordinate with each other, group-based compensation results in better
performance than does individual-based compensation. However, when they can
coordinate, the level of performance is higher in the individual-based compensation
condition than in the group-based compensation condition. These results indicate that
when people are, at least partially, compensated based on others’ work, they tend to exert
less effort.
Consistent with Rankin (2004), Heijden, Potters, and Martin (2009) find a similar
result. They examine the supervision effect on group performance. In the experimental
setting, in the condition where there was no leader in a group, all team members received
an equal share of team output, which was similar to the group-based compensation
discussed above. In the condition where a leader was present, the leader could monitor
the effort of each team member in order to allocate team profit. Participants in groups of
four decided the amount of effort they would like to exert in two options, A and B. Each
choice of B increased group performance in a nonlinear function, representing working.
If participants chose option A, then the group performance would not change, but
participants would receive an additional 120 points besides their share of group output.
Hence, option A represented shirking in the task. They find that average team output is
significantly lower in the profit-sharing condition than in the leader-determined
condition. In addition, their results show that the variance in the output is due to less
effort exerted in the profit-sharing condition. Heijden et al. (2009) explicitly show that
group-based incentives create free-riding issues in team working environments, which
reduce ultimate team performance.
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Though group-based incentives create free-riding problems, they are considered
appropriate incentive schemes for organizations in which cooperation is a critical factor
in business success because economic incentives have a stronger effect on influencing
individual behavior (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002).
Tournament and Sabotage
If the economic incentives are effective in shaping individual behavior, then an
intuitive approach to reducing the free-riding problem is to reward individuals based on
their relative individual performance (Rynes et al. 2005; Heneman and Von Hippel
1995). The most common example of relative rewards within teams are bonuses such as
“employee of the month” rewards or job promotion. The reason why relative rewards are
commonly used in practice is that it is less costly to measure relative individual
performance than absolute individual performance (Irlenbusch and Ruchala 2008).
Furthermore, when common uncertainty increases relative performance becomes more
informative than absolute individual performance (Frederickson 1992). For example,
after hurricane Harvey passed Houston, TX in 2017, thousands of vehicles were flood
damaged. If we compare car dealers’ 2017 car-sale performance to prior years’
performance, it is easy to conclude that their 2017 sales performance is better. However,
this result may solely be due to a larger market demand after the hurricane but not the
dealers’ marketing strategy. Thus, it is hard to say if they were doing a good job. It is
even harder to tell which dealer was doing a better job based on their absolute sales
information. Instead of comparing their performance vertically, comparing the dealers’
2017 performance horizontally, to compare dealers’ relative performance to each other,
allows an observer to more easily pinpoint the best dealers in the area.
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Relative reward incentives are also known as tournaments (Lazear and Rosen
1981). Tournament incentives alleviate the free-riding problem in that such incentives
motivate individuals to compete for higher rank with higher compensations. The
competition induces individuals to exert more effort, aligning individual interests with
organizational goals. However, since only relative performance is compared among
employees, working hard is not the only means to earn bigger rewards. Individuals may
engage in counter-productive behavior such as sabotage (Harbring and Irlenbusch 2011)
to achieve such goals. That is, if an employee is motivated to outrank a competitor, this is
not only achievable by improving one’s performance, but also by weakening the
performance of their competitors. In this study, I examine one of the most common forms
of sabotage: covertly reducing coworkers’ output. It is attractive because this type of
sabotage in organizations is less observable in that it often takes more implicit forms such
as talking bad about colleagues or withholding useful information from peers. Hence, it is
challenging to align employee behavior with the interests of organizations in tournament
schemes.
Motivations behind sabotage vary from social incentives to economic incentives
(Ambrose, Seabright, and Schminke 2002). For example, sabotage increases as the prize
spread increases (Vandegrift, Yavas, and Brown 2007; Harbring and Irlenbusch 2008;
Harbring and Irlenbusch 2011; Amegashie 2012, Lazear 1989). Furthermore, Charness,
Masclet, and Villeval (2014) show that social-comparison factors can also motivate
participants to sabotage. In their setting, the participants were matched in groups of three
and asked to do a decoding task under a flat wage scheme. Providing rank information
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motivated the participants to invest in costly sabotage to improve their rank. Such
unethical behavior results in a substantial detrimental effect on ultimate performance.
The target of sabotage is also various, from high performers to low performers.
For example, Chen (2003) and Münster (2007) theoretically show that in a tournament,
employees sabotage the most able peer because s/he is considered the greatest threat to
others. However, Amegashie and Runkel (2007) analytically show that the employee
with the most ability may be the only person who engages in sabotage. Unlike previous
models of sabotage, contestants in Amegashie and Runkel (2007) model cannot sabotage
their current opponents but instead potential future opponents in the next stage of the
contest. Given the most able contestant has a higher probability of advancing to the next
stage of the contest, there is an equilibrium in which s/he engages in sabotage while
others do not.
Since workplace sabotage adversely affects both individual financial health and
the financial health of the organization as a whole (Jeter 2010), researchers have
examined many remedies. Some have suggested external recruitment in tournaments
because someone who has not yet join the company is hard to sabotage (Chen 2005,
2003; Lazear 1989). Using a two-stage contest experiment, Gürtler, Münster, and Nieken
(2013) show that eliminating relative performance information in the first stage can
mitigate the destructive effect of sabotage. Mujumdar, Price, and Doleh (2016) suggest
using alternative incentives as a performance-enhancing device rather than tournament
incentives. In addition, Smith (2016) shows that having employees certify a code of
conduct can reduce sabotage against coworkers. However, these solutions are not without
drawbacks. Though recruiting people from outside of the organization can reduce
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sabotage, the outsiders possess less knowledge about the organization than those insiders,
potentially resulting in less performance efficiency. Concealing relative performance
information not only reduces the destructive effect of sabotage but also may reduce the
positive effect of competition. In addition, these solutions are studied at the individual
level, which is based solely on individual relative performance.

Mixed Compensation
and Social Dilemma
Based on the discussion above, researchers argue that a compensation scheme that
incorporates elements of both individual incentives and group incentives is more
effective in motivating performance at both the individual level and the group level
(Kozlowski and Ilgen 2006; DeMatteo et al. 1998; Pearce and Ravlin 1987). They argue
that the advantages of one type of incentive offsets the disadvantages of the other type of
the incentive (Welbourne and Mejia 1995). There is evidence that mixed incentives are
used in practice. For example, in the internal audit department of Ameritech, employees
of audit teams are compensated for both their relative performance rankings and the
team’s performance (Parker et al. 2001). In fact, a survey by Lawler et al. (2003) shows
that in 1990, 33 percent of the surveyed companies used mixed incentives to compensate
their employees. This percentage increased to 62 percent by the year 2002 (Table 2,
p13)6.
Though the previous argument indicates the advantages of mixed incentives over
both individual incentives and group incentives, the evidence in the literature is mixed.

6

There were five possible types of incentives covered in the survey: individual incentives, profit sharing,
gainsharing, employee stock ownership, and work group or team incentives. The percentage using mixed
incentives is the percentage of companies using more than one incentive to compensate employees.
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Pearsall et al. (2010) find that mixed incentives lead to a higher level of group
performance than group incentives or individual incentives. Further, they provide
evidence that a) participants in the mixed incentives condition shared more information
than those in the individual incentive condition; b) participants in the mixed incentives
condition exerted more effort than those in the group incentive condition. In conclusion,
mixed incentives appear to induce cooperation and reduce free-riding compared to
individual incentives and group incentives, respectively.
Extending Pearsall et al. (2010), Barnes et al. (2011) compare the effect of group
incentives and mixed incentives on group performance ion a war game setting. They find
that mixed incentives lead to higher speed than do group incentives and that participants
identified and attacked more targets in the mixed incentives condition than in the group
incentive condition. However, mixed incentives lead to lower accuracy and less
cooperation (e.g., backing up support received from other team members) than do group
incentives.
In contrast, in a study of service technician performance at Xerox Corporation,
Wageman (1995) finds that mixed incentives lead to poorer performance and lower
employee satisfaction than do group incentives and individual incentives. Additionally,
mixed incentives are detrimental to helping behavior.
Using a decision-making experiment, Quigley et al. (2007) find that the level of
information shared in the mixed incentives condition and the individual incentive
condition was lower than that in the group incentive condition. In addition, there is no
significant difference in the level of information shared between the mixed incentives
condition and the individual incentive condition.
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Irlenbusch and Ruchala (2008) use teams of four and a computer-based non-real
effort experiment to examine the effect of three types of performance-based
compensation on group performance (group-based compensation, group-based
compensation with a higher relative reward, and group-based compensation with a lower
relative reward.) In the experiment, participants decided the level of effort input. The
computer calculated the payoffs of the four group members based on effort levels. They
find that group-based compensation induces more cooperation while group-based
compensation with a higher relative reward induces more effort. They further provide
evidence that the competition introduced by relative rewards “crowd out” voluntary
cooperation within the experimental teams.
Using groups of three in two production environments (assembly line and teams),
Libby and Thorne (2009) examine worker performance under three compensation
systems (individual, group, and mixed). The experimental task required participants to
build “toy castles” using LEGOTM blocks. The experiment setting was similar to the one
in Drake et al. (1999). However, in the assembly line environment, participants were not
allowed to communicate or work together. In the team environment, participants were
allowed to communicate and move to others’ workstations. That is, in the team
environment, participants were able to cooperate in the task but were not in the assembly
line environment. They find that in the group environment, group performance was better
in the group incentive condition than in the individual and the mixed condition. There
was no significant difference in group performance among the three incentive conditions
in the assembly line environment. They argue that negative effects may exist in the mixed
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incentives condition because this incentive may send a confusing signal to participants
regarding where to direct their effort.
The contradictory evidence of mixed incentives effects on performance in the
literature may be due to the social dilemma issue embedded in the compensation scheme.
A social dilemma is a situation where there is a conflict between individual and collective
interests. Facing a social dilemma, each party is better off individually by defecting
instead of cooperating, but all individuals are worse off if they all choose to defect rather
than cooperate (Dawes 1980). That is, if a group is successful, then defectors can share
the group rewards at no individual cost, and if the group is unsuccessful, then they do not
lose any cooperative contributions (Probst, Carnevale, and Triandis 1999). If all
individuals choose not to cooperate, then everyone receives an unfavorable outcome.
Greed and fear are the essential determinants of defection (Coombs 1973). Greed
is the motivation of maximizing personal interests and fear is the motivation of
noncooperation which is based on the lack of trust and the feeling of hopelessness
(Yamagishi and Sato 1986). Even if group members are able to cooperate, the
expectation that other group members may not cooperate leads to the fear that the
cooperative behavior will be taken advantage of. Furthermore, when one’s compensation
is based on his/her performance relative to others’, such incentives create competition.
That said, group members are often motivated more by the tournament incentive
than the group incentive when both incentives are present (Dawes 1980). Hence, social
dilemmas motivate individuals to focus more on maximizing self-interests than
maximizing group interests through more competition and less cooperation.

CHAPTER 3

HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

In this chapter, I introduce goal setting theory, social identity theory, and develop
six hypotheses regarding individual behaviors and performance in a mixed-incentives
setting.

Research Setting
I conducted an experiment to test the hypotheses in this chapter. In the task,
participants were formed into pairs working on a decoding task, in which they were
assigned different level pair goals, easy vs. difficult. Their compensation was based on
two criteria. First, if the pair output met the pair budget goal, each participant would be
paid an equal amount of money. Further, the participant with a higher output would earn
a bigger individual bonus, and the other participant would earn a smaller individual
bonus. Therefore, my setting required both cooperation and competition, because it may
be difficult for participants to achieve the pair goal alone. Meanwhile, there was
motivation for earning the bigger bonus. To allow for cooperation and competition, I
incorporated several options in the experiment. Specifically, the first option was sharing.
Participants could use this option to share their decoding keys. By design, the more keys
they had, the more codes they could decipher. The other option was sabotage.
Participants could use this option to reduce the teammate’s output to provide a greater
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chance of winning the bigger bonus. To avoid the concern that providing only two
options would force participants to cooperate or sabotage, I added a third option, extra
time. By choosing this option, participants would work given a longer period of time on
their decoding task. The experimental design is discussed thoroughly in Chapter 4.

Budget Goal Difficulty
Goal setting theory suggests that goal difficulty is positively correlated with
performance and that goals regulate individual behavior (Hisrt and Yetton 1999; Hirst
and Lowy 1990; Locke and Latham 1990; Hirst 1987; Locke et al. 1984; Rockness 1977).
For example, Webb, Williamson, and Zhang (2013) find that the productivity of
individuals assigned a challenging goal is higher than those assigned an easy goal. They
suggest that assigning challenging targets is effective to motivate productive effort.
However, this positive relation exists until individuals exceed the limit of their ability, the
point beyond which the linear relation does not hold true (Locke 1982).
Since the positive relation between goal difficulty and performance only holdes in
the relevant range of individuals’ ability, assigning goals of different difficulty level can
also affect individuals’ risk-taking preference. For example, Sprinkle, Williamson, and
Upton (2008) report that when a budget goal is difficult, individuals tend to increase their
effort and choose low risks, compared to when a budget goal is easy.
In addition to individual goals, group goals are considered an important source of
motivation for individuals in groups (Zhang 1998; Locke and Latham 1990; Zander
1980). The role of task strategy development is critical at the group level in that groups
face a constant need for cooperation due to the nature of interdependence embedded in
group tasks (Van Mierlo and Kleingeld 2010; Kozlowski and Bell 2003). Hackman and
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Oldham (1980) define task strategy in groups as the choices group members would like to
choose to achieve the group goals. An important difference in task strategies lies between
competitive strategies and cooperative strategies (Van Mierlo and Kleingeld 2010; Tauer
and Harackiewicz 2004; Crown and Rosse 1995). Hence, a difficult group goal improves
performance in that it not only induces more effort but also motivates group members to
develop more efficient strategies and promotes cooperation among group members
(Weldon and Weingart 1988). For instance, the experimental results in Seijts and Latham
(2000) suggest that a difficult goal leads to more cooperation than does a modest goal
(Figure 4, p112).
As discussed above, the literature provides evidence that individuals invest more
effort and cooperate more toward achieving a difficult goal. Many studies discussed here
focuses mainly on either individual goals or group goals per se. However, in practice,
individuals in an organization are continually facing multiple goals. These goals are
sometimes conflicting. As to the effectiveness of mixed incentives, Mitchell and Silver
(1990) find that performance was higher in the mixed goal condition than in the
individual goal condition. More directly related to the current study, they find that
cooperative strategies were significantly more likely to occur in the mixed goals, the
group goal, and the no specific goal conditions than in the individual goal condition. The
study suggests that when mixed goals are difficult, individuals are likely to choose
cooperative strategies to improve both individual and group performance.7

7

Mitchell and Silver (1990) did not directly measure participants’ cooperative strategies. Instead, they used
a self-reported questionnaire to measure the “cooperation feeling” such that they asked participants to
indicate the extent to which “you and your coworker felt like a team” on a 7-point Likert scale.
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However, Weldon, Jehn, and Pradhan (1991) find that there is no significant
difference in cooperation between easy goals and difficult goals. In their study,
cooperation was measured as the number of times help was offered or requested by group
members. However, their results may not be generalizable for two reasons. First, they
used a narrowed operationalization of cooperation (Weldon and Weingart 1993) because
the amount of help requested only indicates the possibility of cooperation. It does not
directly reflect the true cooperative behavior. Second, group members might help each
other without even talking about it. Hence, in the current study, I measure an explicit
form of cooperation.
Consistent with Mitchell and Silver (1990), Van Mierlo and Kleingeld (2010) find
that participants ranked highest on competition and lowest on cooperation and
performance in the individual goal condition. However, they also report that performance
and cooperation were highest in the nonspecific goal condition, whereas Mitchell and
Silver (1990) report that there is no difference in performance and cooperation across the
group goal, the mixed goal, and the nonspecific goal conditions.8
The literature only suggests the positive effect of goal difficulty on cooperation
and performance in the mixed goal setting. Therefore, the current study extends the goalsetting literature by directly exploring the impact of group goal difficulty on individual
strategies and performance in a mixed goal setting.

8

Similar to Mitchell and Silver (1990), Van Mierlo and Kleingeld (2010) measured competition and
cooperation using 7-point Likert scales but not a direct measure of cooperation.
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Hypotheses 1 and 2 – The Effect of Pair Budget
Goal Difficulty on Individual Strategies
When individuals face pair budget goals, as discussed in the previous chapter,
they develop strategies to achieve those goals. However, I argue that this strategic
development depends on an individual’s perception of risk about meeting the goals.
In general, participants in the current study earn a pair bonus for meeting the pair
budget goal. If the goal is achieved, then the person with a relatively higher output will
receive a bigger personal bonus, and the person with a relatively lower output will
receive a smaller personal bonus. If the pair budget goal is not met, neither participant
earns anything.
In the easy pair budget goal condition, the pair goal can be achieved easily by one
team member. Thus, participants should not cooperate by sharing personal keys with each
other in that sharing personal keys can not only increase the pair output but also reduce
the individual’s probability of winning the bigger individual bonus.9 Personal keys are
critical to generating output in the task. Hence, when meeting the pair goal is certain,
participants should try to maximize their wealth by earning the bigger individual bonus.
Sharing can increase the risk of losing the big bonus. Hence, they may not choose to
share their keys but rather prefer relatively risky alternative, sabotage, to outperform the
teammate to win the bigger individual bonus.10

9

Note that in the task, participants have two options to increase absolute output and one option to increase
relative output (the research design is discussed in detail in chapter 4). Sharing personal keys with the
teammate can increase the pair absolute output and working extra time can increase personal absolute
output. Sabotage can increase participants’ relative output compared to that of their teammate.
10
Sabotage is a risky alternative to maximize personal payoff because there are chances that participants
will not achieve the group goal if they sabotage each other too much. In addition, there is a 5 percent
chance that the system may misrecord 20 units output for each participant in a pair. Therefore, they could
miss the group goal by sabotaging and earn nothing.
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In the difficult pair budget goal condition, the pair goal cannot be achieved by a
single team member. Sharing personal keys, in this case, will increase the pair’s
probability of achieving the pair goal. Hence, participants in this condition should
cooperate more than those in the easy pair budget goal condition. In addition, I expect in
this condition that participants will sabotage less because any reduction of the teammate’s
output could prevent the pair from meeting the pair goal in which case the participants
will not earn any bonus. In summary, the first two hypotheses are stated as follows in the
alternate form.
H1: The difficult pair budget goal will induce more cooperation than the
easy pair budget goal.
H2: The difficult pair budget goal will induce less sabotage than the easy
pair budget goal.

Social Identity Theory
Social Identity Theory posits that a person’s self-concept is based on his/her
group membership within a social category (Tajfel and Turner 1979).11 Through a
process of social comparison, individuals differentiate between in-group members and
outgroup members. Social identification occurs through the perception of belongingness
to a particular group. Tajfel (1978) describes identity as the “part of an individual's selfconcept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group together
with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (P.63). Thus,
individuals are emotionally and psychologically connected with ingroup members.
Therefore, social identity can be distinguished from personal identity, which refers to

11

In a group setting, the terms social identity and group identity are synonymous.
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self-concept that derives from unique personal attributes (Turner 1982). To secure a
positive self-concept, group members are motivated to behave in the way that favors
one’s group over outgroups (Tajfel 1978).
Social identification is activated through a psychological self-categorization
process through which individuals group themselves with others and make decisions that
favor their own groups (Tajfel and Turner 1986). The self-categorization process is a
depersonalization transition through which individuals do not perceive themselves as
complex, unique persons but rather as representatives of a group. When social identity is
adopted, the decision-making process shifts from an individual perspective to a group
perspective (Tajfel and Turner 1986), and individuals favor ingroup members over
outgroup members.12 To the extent that the group identity is positively valued, the selfcategorization process increases mutual attraction among ingroup members, resulting in a
cohesive ingroup environment (Turner 1987). However, social identity and group
cohesion are not the same concepts. The key difference between social identity and group
cohesion is that social identity is an attraction to the group itself, but cohesion is a
personal attraction (Towry 2003). When group identification is salient, ingroup members
are perceived as more heterogeneous than outgroup members (Hogg 1992). Hence, the
salience of group membership changes how decisions are made (Lembke and Wilson
1998). For example, Brewer and Kramer (1986) find that the level of cooperation was
higher when participants highly identified with their groups in the common dilemma
condition. However, in the public good condition, strong group identity led to less
cooperation.

12

Social identity theory was initially applied to understanding inter-group processes. Different behaviors
are directed toward ingroup members and outgroup members (Tajfel and Turner 1979).
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Wit and Wilke (1992) find that in the three social dilemmas examined (prisoner’s
dilemma, chicken dilemma, and trust dilemma), strong group identity leads to a higher
level of cooperation. However, participants were not allowed to interact with one another.
In addition, their experiment was a one-shot game involving no decision-making over
time.
A handful of studies address the effect of social identity in accounting settings.
King (2002) shows that strong group identity reduces auditors’ tendency to over rely on
clients’ noncredible communications. Specifically, King (2002) investigates the
interaction between auditors and their clients and finds that clients use “cheap talk” to
build trust in the auditors, which creates a “self-serving bias.” Then the clients can
commit greater fraud. King (2002) reports that the self-serving bias can be reduced by
increasing the salience of the auditors’ group identity and by developing social norms.
Towry (2003) experimentally examines the interaction effect of group identity
and incentive systems on performance in a team setting. She reports that strong group
identity increases coordination in teams. However, this effect can either enhance or
weaken the effectiveness of incentive systems. Specifically, it degraded the effectiveness
of a vertical incentive system. In the vertical incentive system, agents colluded against
the principal. They chose a low level of resources and reported falsely. However, it
increased the effectiveness of a horizontal incentive system. In the horizontal incentive
system, compensation was based on team output. There were no opportunities to collude.
Hence, the strong group identity helped teams reach a cooperative solution.
Kelly and Presslee (2017) find that the performance of strongly identified groups
was lower than that of weakly identified groups. They argue that the effect of group
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identity on performance is mediated by other-regarding concerns, i.e., concerns for others
and competitiveness. Increasing group identity reduces competitiveness. However, such
an effect is only observed in the large winner portion condition but not in the small
winner portion condition. This indicates that enhancing group identity can only reduce
competitiveness to a certain extent. Participants in their experiment were compensated
based on a competitive tournament incentive. This compensation creates a lose-or-win
condition. It does not change the participant’s focus in the task, to win the tournament.
The key difference between these studies and the current study is that the current
study is based on mixed compensation incentives where conflicts of interest are
embedded. It is not clear whether the effect of group identity can shift individual focus to
group incentives from individual incentives. If so, will the advantages of the two
incentives suppress the disadvantages of each other or will one type of incentive with its
(dis)advantages completely dominate the other? The answer is not clear.
Blazovich (2013) investigates the interaction effect of group identity and
performance-based compensation on performance. He finds that regardless of group
identity, performance is higher in the mixed incentive condition than in the individual
incentive and the group incentive conditions. Therefore, firms appear to be better off
offering a combination of group and individual performance-based compensation.
However, the results of Blazovich’s (2013) study are not directly applicable to the
current study. The incentive system investigated in the current study is the combination
of a group performance-based compensation and a tournament-based compensation. The
compensation design in Blazovich (2013), both for the group and for the individual, is a
piece-rate incentive. Therefore, though two compensation schemes presented, there were
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no conflicts of interest in his design. The tournament component is different from the
piece-rate incentive in that the tournament competition can result in destructive behavior
among teammates. This effect was not investigated in Blazovich (2013). The purpose of
offering the combination of a group-based compensation and an individual-based
compensation is to alleviate free riding and encourage effort input. However, his design
did not allow for competition among teammates.
I am aware of only one study indirectly addressing the effect of group identity on
sabotage. Charness et al. (2014) find that introducing group identity can discourage
sabotage among teammates while maintaining in-group competition. More specifically,
they show that participants from the same school were less likely to sabotage against their
teammates than participants from different schools. Group members from the same
school were more likely to increase their rank through effort investment. However, in a
group of more than two individuals, sabotage can only be directed to one of the rivals,
whereas increasing effort level allows the participant to increase his/her rank relative to
the other participants. Hence, the finding is not generalizable due to the issue of relative
cost. In the current study, I use groups of two to examine the effect of group identity on
sabotage. This setting allows me to isolate the issue of relative cost, which can increase
the external validity of the findings.
Hypothesis 3 – The Effect of Pair Identity
on Individual Strategies
When individuals are compensated on multilevel goals, they face conflicts of
interests. The mixed incentives in the current study compensate individuals not only for
achieving a pair budget goal but also based on their relative performance when the pair
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goal is achieved.13 Hence, it is difficult for individuals to decide whether to cooperate
with or compete against their teammates to maximize their personal benefit.
Although prior literature shows a positive relation between pair identity and
cooperation, no prior research investigates whether and how pair identity influences
individual behavior in a mixed incentives scheme where sabotage is allowed. I predict
that participants in the weak pair identity condition will sabotage more to increase their
personal payoff. However, I expect this effect will occur only when the pair budget goal
is easy.
Individuals in highly identified groups cognitively categorize themselves with
their teammates through a self-categorization process. This depersonalization process
creates social attraction to the highly identified groups (Hogg 1992). The social
attraction, in turn, creates a positive feeling that one individual has about his/her
teammates (Hogg 1992). In addition, stronger group identification can also increase an
individual’s concerns for others in their groups and such concerns can reduce the degree
of competitiveness (Kelly and Presslee 2017). Consequently, a strong group identity can
mitigate the disadvantages of the tournament incentive. More specifically, it can reduce
sabotage in a pair. However, I expect this effect will occur only in the easy pair budget
goal condition. This is because the low risk-taking behavior induced by the difficult pair
budget goal motivates participants in a pair to cooperate with each other. Any sabotage
activity can prevent the pair from achieving the pair goal in which case neither participant
will earn anything. Hence, in the difficult budget goal condition, regardless of pair
identity, participants should share more of their personal keys with each other and

13

A pair is a special case of groups where a pair has only two members. Pair Identity in the paper is
equivalent to group identity in the literature.
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sabotage less. On the other hand, in the easy pair budget goal condition, the pair goal is
easy to achieve such that a team member’s self-output is enough to achieve the pair goal.
In this case, earning the bigger individual bonus becomes salient. In the strong pair
identity condition, the social attraction and concern for others should motivate
participants to sabotage less. In fact, Charness et al. (2014) report that in the groups
where participants with strong group identity sabotaged less than those with weak group
identity. This hypothesis is summarized in the alternate form.
H3: When the pair budget goal is easy, strong pair identity will induce less
sabotage than weak pair identity.
Hypothesis 4 – The Effect of Pair Identity
on Extra Time
In the Easy Pair Budget Goal condition, since one participant can easily meet the
pair goal by himself or herself, sharing personal keys will reduce his or her chance of
winning the bigger personal bonus. In this condition, when the pair is highly identified,
participants should sabotage less, hence spending extra time to produce more output
should increase their chance of winning the bigger personal bonus. However, when the
pair budget goal is easy, participants in the weak pair identity condition will likely
sabotage more. Such destructive activity may prevent the pair from achieving the pair
goal. Thus, the participants should spend extra time to produce more output to offset the
sabotage effect on meeting the pair goal. In summary, when the pair budget goal is easy,
in both the strong and the weak pair identity condition, I expect that participants will
invest a similar amount of extra time to work on the task. As it is uncertain which of the
two competing arguments above would dominate, I make the following null hypothesis:
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H4 (null): In the Easy Pair Budget Goal condition, enhancing pair identity
will have no impact on Extra Time.
I did not predict the effect of pair identity in the Difficult Pair Budget Goal
condition because the difficult stretch goal motivates participants to work at their highest
effort level to earn the compensations. This motivation could lead participants to spend a
similar amount of extra time on the decoding task. Therefore, I expect in the Difficult
Pair Budget Goal condition, there will be no difference in spending extra time between
strongly identified pairs and weakly identified pairs.

Hypothesis 5– The Effect of Pair Budget Goal
Difficulty and Pair Identity on Performance
As discussed above, if a difficult pair budget goal can lead to more cooperation
and less sabotage, then performance in the difficult pair budget goal condition should be
higher than that in the easy pair budget goal condition. In addition, as predicted, strong
pair identity should result in less sabotage. Thus, performance should be higher in the
strong pair identity condition than in the weak pair identity condition. Hence, difficult
pair budget goal and/or strong pair identity could result in high pair output. These
hypotheses are summarized in the alternative form.
H5: Output will be higher in the Strong Pair Identity condition than in the
Weak Pair Identity condition.
H6: Output will be higher in the Difficult Pair Budget Goal condition than in
the Easy Pair Budget Goal condition.
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CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

I use a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment, manipulating Pair Identity (strong vs.
weak) and Pair Budget Difficulty (easy vs. difficult) as the independent variables. The
dependent variables include Sharing (cooperation), Extra Time (extra effort), and
Sabotage (Competition), as well as Individual Output and Pair Output, which are referred
to as participant performance. In the experiment, participants complete a computer-based
decoding task. Experiment sessions lasted approximately 90 minutes and took place in a
computer lab.

Experimental Task and Participants
Experimental Task
In the task scenario, Beta company designs computer programs and participants
act as program testers for Beta company. Specifically, participants decode letters into
numbers in pairs to test part of a newly designed program for five rounds.14 I used an
adapted version of a real effort decoding task similar to the one used in Arnold and
Tafkov (2015). The task was carried out using the z-Tree program (Fischbacher 2007).
In each work round, each participant in a pair was given a different list of five
numerical keys to decode two-letter combinations. The keys were valid only for the

14

In this chapter, the term “pair” and the term “team” are used interchangeably.
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current round. The letter combinations were randomly generated from the key lists
provided to the participants in each pair. The key list was displayed on the screen
throughout the task. Participants in a pair were not able to see each other’s keys if they
did not share. That is, each participant in a pair can only decode half of the letter
combinations appearing in the task if keys were not shared. During the task, participants
received real-time feedback about their current task output. The pair output goal set by
the company was also displayed on the screen during the task. The output goal was the
same throughout the five work rounds. Each work round lasted between 3 minutes and 4
minutes and 40 seconds, depending on each participants’ task strategy, which is
explained in the next paragraph. At the end of each work round, participants received
feedback about their performance in the round.
The task allowed for cooperation, working overtime, and sabotage. Specifically,
at the start of each work round, each participant in a pair was given ten points to allocate
among these three alternatives. The points represent the limited resources people possess
in real life (i.e., energy). The points could not be carried forward to future rounds and
participants had to use all of their 10 points in each round. The first alternative was
sharing. That is, each participant in a pair could share their personal keys by allocating
points to alternative one at the rate of two points for each of their personal keys. If they
wanted to share all their five personal keys, then they could allocate the 10 points to this
alternative. The second alternative was working overtime. Each work round started with
three minutes. By allocating points to alternative two, participants could work longer on
their decoding task, one point for working ten extra seconds on top of the initial three
minutes. To allocate all ten points to this alternative, participants could spend a total of 4
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minutes and 40 seconds on the task in a round. There was a clock on the screen to help
them track the time remaining in each round. The third alternative was sabotage. By
allocating one point to this alternative, participants could reduce their teammate’s
correctly decoded combinations by two units. If participants allocate all points to this
alternative, then they could reduce their teammate’s output by 20 units. Since participants
were assigned in pairs, to reduce the reciprocal effect of sabotage I introduced a noise
factor into the task. I designed a system error rate of final output in the task. In the task,
participants were told that there was a 5% chance that they might lose up to 20 units
output in each round. In addition, the system design allowed participants to lose at most
20 units output each round from sabotage. Hence, it is difficult for participants to be
certain whether the unit loss was due to the system error or teammate sabotage. The
output was called recorded output in the task and was reported in the feedback at the end
of each round. Instead of calling them cooperation, working overtime, and sabotage, I
used a neutral word “alternative” to avoid the framing effect on participant points
allocating strategies.
My setting also provided participants with an opportunity to shirk. In the
decoding stage, there was an “I am done with the period” button on the screen. They
could finish the round early by clicking the button and not do any work until the next
round starts. An example of the task screen is shown in Appendix D.

Participants
Student participants were recruited for the study at a public university in the U.S.
It is important to match participants with an experimental task (Bonner et al. 2000). Ball
and Czech (1996) shows that higher-educated or more experienced participants perform
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effort-sensitive tasks similar to less-educated participants. Hence, college students are
appropriate participants in this task given the feature of the decoding task.

Manipulated Independent Variables
and Dependent Variables
Manipulated Independent Variables
I manipulated two independent variables: Pair Identity (strong or weak) and Pair
Budget Difficulty (easy or difficult).
The first independent variable was Pair Identity. Following Kelly and Presslee
(2017), I manipulated this variable using a slogan guessing game. Half of the participants
were assigned to the Strong Pair Identity condition, and the other half were assigned to
the Weak Pair Identity condition. Pair Identity was manipulated between sessions at the
pair level. That is, all pairs in the same session experienced the same pair identity
manipulation. Each pair wore T-shirts of the same color. Each pair was asked to create
and write down a unique pair name on a piece of paper. Then the pairs played the slogan
guessing game in which each pair guessed the company or product names that they
believed were associated with various slogans (e.g., “What can Brown Do For You” UPS). The pairs competed against other pairs to identify the most correct company or
product names. The winning pair received a bag of candy (valued at 10 dollars) as the
award. The slogan guessing game helped build strong pair identity through pair
collaboration and communication, sharing common results, and competing against other
teams (Kelly and Presslee 2017; Eckel and Grossman 2005; Friedkin and Simpson 1985).
Pairs guessed 16 slogans. Losing the slogan guessing competition may adversely affect
the pair identity manipulation. For example, participants may blame their teammate for
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losing the competition. Therefore, the winning pair was announced at the end of the
session to avoid the effect of performance in the slogan guessing game on pair identity
manipulation (Kelly and Presslee 2017).
After completing the slogan guessing game, participants in the Strong Pair
Identity condition remained in the same pairs and used the same pair name they created
before to work on the decoding task. Participants in the Weak Pair Identity condition
were reassigned into new pairs and given new pair names by the experiment
administrators before they began to work on the decoding task. That is, pairs were formed
by pairing two participants wearing different color T-shirts. Hence, participants in the
Strong Pair Identity condition had more opportunities to interact with their teammate.
Participants in the Weak Pair Identity condition had little interaction with their newly
paired teammate. To make the pair identity manipulation stronger, I used the words
“team” and “teammate” in the Strong Pair Identity condition, and the words “pair” and
“counterpart” in the Weak Pair Identity condition.
The second independent variable was Pair Budget Difficulty. Through extensive
pilot tests, the easy goal for a pair was to successfully decode 50 combinations, and the
difficult goal was to successfully decode 110 combinations.15 Pairs were randomly
assigned between the Easy Pair Budget Goal condition and the Difficult Pair Budget Goal
condition.

15

The mean pair output in the pilot study was about 80 combinations. The easy goal of 50 combination is
two standard deviations below the mean. The difficult goal of 110 combination is two standard deviations
above the mean
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Dependent Variables
There were five dependent variables in this study. Sharing was the number of
points allocated to alternative one in each round. Extra Time was represented by the
number of points allocated to alternative two in each round. Sabotage was measured as
the number of points allocated to alternative three in each round. Individual Output was
measured as a participant’s actual number of letter combinations successfully decoded in
each round subtracting the number of combinations sabotaged by the teammate.16 Pair
Output was the sum of Individual Output of the two participants in a pair. That is the sum
of the two participants’ successfully decoded letter combinations in each round minus the
units sabotaged by each other in each round in a pair.

Experimental Procedures
Upon arrival, participants read and signed consent forms, which provided general
information regarding the purpose of the study. Then, each participant was given a
unique worker ID number which was used throughout the entire experiment so that
responses could not be tied to specific individuals. They were randomly assigned into one
of the four experimental conditions.
An experiment administrator then explained the task procedures. First, for the pair
identity manipulation, participants played a slogan guessing competition. After the slogan
guessing competition, participants answered three questions regarding pair identity.

16

Individual Output is different from participant recorded output, which is provided in the round-end
feedback. Participant recorded output is the number of letter combinations successfully decoded by a
participant minus the units sabotaged by the teammate and the units mis-recorded by the system error. The
experimental task is discussed from page 34 to page 36.
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Second, after they answered all three questions and the experiment administrator
collected the answer sheet, the decoding task began. For Weak Pair Identity condition,
participants were formed into new pairs to work on the decoding task. For the Strong Pair
Identity condition, the same pairs formed in the slogan guessing competition
continuously worked on the decoding task.
Before the decoding task started, the experiment administrators read the
instructions and explained the task. A sample of the task was demonstrated on the
computer screens. To ensure that all participants understood the task, they were required
to answer nine pre-task questions. The decoding task did not begin until all participants
answered all questions correctly.
Before the five experimental rounds started, participants completed two threeminute practice rounds. At the start of each experimental round, each participant in a pair
was provided with a unique list of five numerical keys and ten points to allocate between
three alternatives. After they completed allocating points, the experiment task began. The
original five numerical keys plus the keys shared by the teammate were shown on a
participant’s screen. Participants used keyboards to decode the combinations. Participants
received real-time feedback about their current outputs. The pair name and the worker ID
were continuously displayed on the screen throughout the task. When the pair completed
a round, participants were provided with feedback. In addition to their pair name and
worker ID, participants were informed about the pair budget goal, whether their pair
output achieved the pair budget goal or not, individual recorded output, and how much
they would be paid if the round was selected as the payment round. After they reviewed
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the feedback, they clicked on the “Proceed” button on the screen, and the next round
started.
Third, after participants finished the decoding task, they were asked to answer the
same three questions regarding pair identity and completed the post-experiment
questionnaire.
Fourth, after they completed the post-experiment questionnaire, one of the five
rounds were randomly selected as the payment round. Participants were compensated for
the round. Then the winning pair for the slogan guessing competition was announced.
The award of a bag of candy (10 U.S. Dollars) was paid immediately. The participants
were then thanked for participating and left the experiment site.
The compensation scheme in this experiment is a mixed incentive structure.
Participants were paid not only for pair performance but also for individual relative
performance. When the pair recorded output was at or above the pair budget goal, each
one in a pair would be paid five U.S. Dollars. On top of that, the one with the higher final
recorded output would be paid an additional seven U.S. Dollars. The one with the lower
final recorded output would be paid an additional three U.S. Dollars. If the pair output
was below the pair budget goal, then the participants in a pair would be paid zero U.S.
Dollars. One of the five experiment rounds was randomly selected as the payment round
at the end of the task.

CHAPTER 5

RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics and Manipulation Checks
I conducted 12 experimental sessions where participants were randomly assigned
into pairs. In total, 104 students in 52 pairs participated in my study. One participant
responded one on all post-questionnaire items, so the data for this participant’s pair was
removed from the analysis (demographic summary is reported in Table 1).17 93 percent of
the participants were business majors. Males accounted for 47 percent of the data.
Participant age ranged from 18 to 27 with an average age of 21. On average, participants
had 1.3 years of work experience. Participants were paid on average 10.50 U.S. dollars.
I adopted the measures used by Kelly and Presslee (2017) to examine the
effectiveness of the between-subjects manipulation of Pair Identity. Pair Identity was
measured first immediately before the start of the letter-decoding task (the pre-task
measure) and, second, at the end of the letter-decoding task (the post-task measure) using
three items: are you happy to be a part of your team (“pair” for the weak pair identity
condition); do you feel that you are a member of team; do you like your teammate
(“counterpart” for the weak pair identity condition). Participants were asked whether they
agreed or disagreed with the three items using a 7-point Likert scale with endpoints

17

The results of using the uncleaned data are consistent with the results reported.
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labeled “Strongly disagree” (1) and “Strongly agree” (7). Confirmatory Factor Analysis
(CFA) indicated that the three questions captured a unidimensional construct in both the
pre-task and post-task measures. The loadings of the items were at least 0.62 in both the
pre-task measure and the post-task measure. In addition, both the pre-task and the posttask measures had Cronbach’s alpha greater than 0.86. Hence, I averaged the
participants’ response to the three questions as a measure of Pair Identity. Both the pretask and post-task Pair Identity measures were significantly higher in the Strong Pair
Identity condition than in the Weak Pair Identity condition (Pre-task: 6.67 vs. 4.79, t =
13.76, p < 0.01; post-task: 6.02 vs. 4.93, t = 4.62, p < 0.01). Therefore, the manipulation
of Pair Identity appears to be successful.

Table 1. Demographic Summary

Age

Work
Experience

Gender

Major

Ethics Class

Min
Max
Mean
SD
n
Min
Max
Mean
SD
n
Male
Female
n
Business
Other
n
Taken
Not Taken
n

Weak Pair Identity
Easy Pair
Difficult Pair
Budget Goal
Budget Goal
19
19
27
22
21
20
2
1
21a
24
0
0
4
6
1.45
1.56
1.65
1.68
22
24
11
17
11
7
22
24
16
17
6
7
22
24
5
6
17
18
22
24

a. One participant did not disclose age.

Strong Pair Identity
Easy Pair
Difficult Pair
Budget Goal
Budget Goal
18
18
26
25
21
21
2
2
30
26
0
0
4
4
1.35
0.85
1.28
1.29
30
26
13
13
17
13
30
26
27
25
3
1
30
26
15
8
15
18
30
26
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I used three items in the post-experiment questionnaire to evaluate the success of
the between-subjects manipulation of Pair Budget Goal Difficulty. Specifically,
participants indicated on a 7-point Likert scale ( 1, “strongly disagree”, to 7, “strongly
agree”) if they felt that the team output goal was hard to achieve, if they felt that they had
to work hard to meet the team output goal, and if they felt that it was difficult to meet the
team output goal. CFA indicated that these three items represent well the construct of
Pair Budget Goal Difficulty. The loadings of all three items were greater than 0.73.
Further, Cronbach’s alpha of the construct was 0.91. Therefore, I averaged the
participants’ responds to the three questions as a measure of Pair Budget Goal Difficulty.
The measure of Pair Budget Goal Difficulty was significantly higher in the Difficulty
Pair Budget Goal condition than in the Easy Pair Budget Goal condition (5.55 vs. 3.29, t
= 8.93, p < 0.01). Thus, the manipulation of Pair Budget Goal Difficulty was successful.
Nine questions were asked before the decoding task started to test the
participants’ understanding of the task. The decoding task did not start until all the
participants in a session answered all the questions correctly. In addition, two questions
were asked in the post-experiment questionnaire to examine the effectiveness of the
cooperation strategy (sharing keys) and the sabotage strategy (sabotage teammates). The
questions were “Alternative 1 in the decoding task can be used to increase the team
(‘pair’ for the weak pair identity condition) output” and “Alternative 3 in the decoding
task can be used to decrease my teammate’s (‘counterpart’s’ for the weak pair identity
condition) final output” with “1” indicating strongly disagree and “7” indicating
“strongly agree”. The mean of the questions was 5.70 and 5.38 respectively and was
significantly greater than “4”, the indicator of “neither agree nor disagree” (t = 11.73, p-
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value <0.01; t = 8.73, p-value <0.01, respectively). The mean of the items indicated that
the strategies worked effectively and were consistent with the experimental design.

Tests of Statistical Assumptions
The effects of Pair Identity and Pair Budget Goal Difficulty were examined on
five dependent variables: Sharing, Extra Time, Sabotage, Individual Output (sabotaged),
Pair Output. The primary statistical methods used in my dissertation, Analysis of
Covariance (ANCOVA) and multilevel linear regression, assume that dependent
variables are normally distributed. The Shapiro-Wilk (S-W) test was conducted to
examine the normality of the dependent variables because it is the most powerful
normality test (Razali and Wah 2011). The results for normality test are reported in
Table 2. Sharing and Extra Time were normally distributed in three of the four
experimental conditions but were not normally distributed in the High Identity Difficult
Goal condition. Sabotage and Individual Output (sabotaged) were significantly different
from a normal distribution in all four conditions. Pair Output was not normally
distributed in two of the four conditions. Therefore, I used different regression analysis to
check the robustness for the resutls. The results are reported in the following subsections.

Tests of H1 (Cooperation)
H1 predicted that participants assigned a difficult pair budget goal will share more
than those assigned an easy pair budget goal. The dependent variable is Sharing. This
variable is operationalized as the participants’ points allocated to sharing personal keys
with the teammates (ranged from 0 to 10). In the statistical analysis, I controlled for three
variables, OutputNumberTotal, PreShared, and PreEarning. OutputNumberTotal is the
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number of letter combinations generated for a participant in each round, including the
combinations a participant had a key for and the combinations the participant did not. A
participant who is more capable of doing decoding task may allocate fewer points to add
extra time to the decoding task than a participant who needs more time to decode an
equivalent amount of combinations, resulting in the former allocating more points in
Sharing or Sabotage than the less capable participants. PreShared is the number of keys
shared with a participant by the teammate in the previous round multiplied by two. That
is the points used by the teammate to share keys with a participant in the previous round.
I expect a participant to share more keys when the teammate shared keys with him/her in
the previous round. PreEarning is the amount of cash earned by a participant in the
previous round if the round is selected as payment round. I expect that participants who
earned less in the previous round will share less. Since I controlled lag-round effect, first
round data was not included in the statistical analysis.
Table 3 Panel A reports the aggregate 4-round mean of Sharing for the four
conditions (Strong Pair Identity and Easy Goal, Strong Pair Identity and Hard Goal,
Weak Pair Identity and Easy Goal, Weak Pair Identity and Hard Goal). Figure 1 presents
graphical results, and table 3 Panel B provides the results of the 2 X 2 ANCOVA. The
main effect of pair budget goal difficulty was highly significant (F = 8.99, p-value < 0.01,
one-tailed). As shown in figure 5.1, participants assigned a difficult pair budget goal
shared more than those assigned an easy pair budget goal. The difference in the mean of
sharing between the Easy Pair Budget Goal condition and the Difficult Pair Budget Goal
condition is 0.39. That is, on average, facing a difficult pair budget goal, participants
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shared 9.7 percent more of their resource (keys) with their teammate than those facing an
easy pair budget goal.

Table 2. Normality Test
Experimental Condition
Strong Identity, Easy Goal
Sharinga
Extra Timeb
Sabotagec
Individual Outputd
Pair Outpute
Strong Identity, Difficult Goal
Sharing
Extra Time
Sabotage
Individual Output
Pair Output
Weak Identity, Easy Goal
Sharing
Extra Time
Sabotage
Individual Output
Pair Output
Weak Identity, Difficult Goal
Sharing
Extra Time
Sabotage
Individual Output
Pair Output

Shapiro-Wilk W

P-value (two-tailed)

0.98
0.99
0.80
0.95
0.97

0.08
0.68
<0.01
<0.01
0.21

0.96
0.94
0.78
0.92
0.94

<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
0.01

0.98
0.99
0.86
0.89
0.96

0.12
0.46
<0.01
<0.01
0.10

0.99
0.98
0.86
0.85
0.89

0.89
0.32
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01

a. Sharing is measured as the points allocated to share decoding keys with the teammate.
b. Extra Time is measured as the points allocated to add additional time to own decoding task.
c. Sabotage is measured as the points allocated to reduce the teammate's decoding output.
d. Individual Output is measured as the difference between the actual number of combinations decoded
and the number of output units reduced by the teammate.
e. Pair Output is the sum of individual output in each pair.
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Table 3. ANCOVA Test
for H1 (Cooperation)

Easy Pair Budget
Goal
Difficult Pair Budget
Goal
Marginal

Source
Model
Intercept
GIa
Goalb
GI * Goalc
OutputNumberTotald
PreSharede
PreEarningf
Error
Total

Panel A: Four-round Aggregate Mean for Sharing
Weak Pair
Strong Pair
Identity
Identity
Marginal
4.18
3.90
4.02
(3.26)
(2.57)
(2.88)
n=88
n=120
n=208
4.31
4.50
4.41
(3.03)
(2.77)
(2.89)
n=96
n=104
n=200
4.25
4.18
(3.14)
(2.67)
n=184
n=224
Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Sharing
Type III
Sum of
Mean
Squares
df
Square
1066.74
6
177.79
1627.63
1
1627.63
0.02
1
0.02
52.15
1
52.15
0.08
1
0.08
865.20
1
865.20
0.58
1
0.58
15.53
1
15.53
2327.13
401
5.80
10628
408

FStatistic
30.64
280.47
0.00
8.99
0.01
149.09
0.10
2.68

a. GI refers to Pair Identity: Strong Pair Identity vs. Weak Pair Identity.
b. Goal refers to Budget Goal Difficulty: Easy Pair Budget Goal vs. Difficult Pair Budget Goal.
c. GI*Goal is the interaction of the two independent variables.
d. OutputNumberTotal measures the number of codes a participant was working on in each round.
e. PreShared is the points used by the teammate to share keys with a participant in the previous round.
f. PreEarnings is the amount of cash earned by a participant in the previous round.
g. The p-value is one tailed.

p-value
<0.01
<0.01
0.95
<0.01g
0.91
<0.01
0.75
0.10
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Easy Pair Budget Goal

Difficult Pair Budget Goal

4.60
4.50
4.40

4.50

4.31

4.30
4.20
4.10

4.18

4.00
3.90
3.80

3.90

3.70
3.60

Strong Pair Identity

Weak Pair Identity

Figure 1. Sharing Means Plot

Multilevel linear regression was used to test H1. The multilevel linear regression
method is designed for analyzing multilevel hierarchical data (Field 2017). In my
experimental design, participants were randomly assigned into pairs. Therefore,
individual observations (level 1) were nested within pairs (level 2). Hence, this method is
suitable to test the robustness of the ANCOVA results in that it controls not only for
individual variances but also for pair variances. In addition, the experiment for my
dissertation was a 2 X 2 with 5 rounds design (a mixed design). This method also allows
me to control for the round effect. The results of multilevel linear regression are
presented in Table 4. This analysis confirmed the ANCOVA results, finding a significant
difference in the goal difficulty effect (t = 2.3, p-value = 0.01, one-tailed).
Based on the consistency in the analysis, I conclude that Hypothesis 1 is
supported and that a difficult pair budget goal induces participants to share more of their
personal information with their teammate than an easy pair budget goal.
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Table 4. Multilevel Linear Regression Results
for H1 (Cooperation)
-2 Restricted Log Likelihood: 1885.80

Parameter
Intercept
GIa
Goalb
GI * Goalc
OutputNumberTotald
PreSharede
PreEarningf

Estimate
10.64
-0.02
0.91
0.06
-0.09
-0.03
0.06

Std. Error
0.67
0.33
0.40
0.48
0.01
0.05
0.03

df
374.09
388.86
397.12
388.82
371.24
396.30
387.18

t
15.98
-0.06
2.30
0.13
-12.60
-0.71
1.97

p-value
<0.01
0.95
0.01g
0.90
<0.01
0.48
0.05

a. GI refers to Group Identity: Strong Pair Identity vs. Weak Pair Identity.
b. Goal refers to Pair Budget Goal Difficulty: Easy Pair Budget Goal vs. Difficult Pair Budget Goal.
c. GI*Goal is the interaction of the two independent variables.
d. OutputNumberTotal measures the number of codes a participant was working on in each round.
e. PreShared is the points used by the teammate to share keys with a participant in the previous round.
f. PreEarnings is the amount of cash earned by a participant in the previous round.
g.The p-value is one-tailed.

Tests of H2 and H3 (Sabotage)
Hypothesis 2 predicted that participants assigned a difficult pair budget goal will
sabotage less than those assigned an easy pair budget goal. The variable of interest,
Sabotage, was measured as the points participants used to reduce the teammates’ outputs
in the decoding task. Similar to the analysis for H1, I controlled for three covariables,
OutputNumberTotal, PreShared, and PreEarning. The ANCOVA results are reported in
table 5. As shown in Table 5 Panel B, the main effect of pair budget goal difficulty on
sabotage is significant (F = 10.74, p-value < 0.01, one-tailed). Panel A in table 5 shows
that the mean difference of sabotage between the Easy Pair Budget Goal condition and
the Difficult Pair Budget Goal condition was 0.98. That is, when a difficult pair budget
goal was assigned, participants sabotaged 52.97 percent less than when an easy pair
budget goal was assigned. Recall that the S-W test suggested Sabotage was not normally
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distributed. Therefore, a bootstrap analysis was conducted in that bootstrap method does
not assume a normal distribution of the data (Garson 2012). The results are reported in
Table 6. The bootstrapped results were consistent with the ANCOVA results.
Next, I conducted a multilevel linear regression on sabotage. The results are
shown in Table 7. The effect of pair budget goal difficulty was significant (t = -1.88, pvalue = 0.03, one-tailed). The bootstrapped multilevel results reported in Table 8 (p-value
= 0.03, one-tailed) was consistent with the findings using the previous methods.
Therefore, I conclude that hypothesis 2 is supported.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that in the easy pair budget goal condition, participants in
a highly identified pair will sabotage less than those in a weakly identified pair. I did not
predict the pair identity effect in the difficult pair budget goal condition because I
expected that participants in this condition would sabotage to a similar degree across the
pair identity level (high vs. low). The reason is that any significant sabotage in the
difficult budget goal condition would prevent the participants from achieving their pair
goal and earning any compensation.
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Table 5. ANCOVA Test
for H2 and H3 (Sabotage)
Panel A: Four-round Aggregate Mean for Sabotage
Weak Pair
Strong Pair
Identity
Identity
Marginal
2.17
1.61
1.85
Easy Pair Budget Goal
(2.65)
(2.37)
(2.51)
n=88
n=120
n=208
1.34
0.43
0.87
Difficult Pair Budget Goal
(1.93)
(1.03)
(1.60)
n=96
n=104
n=200
1.74
1.06
Marginal
(2.34)
(1.96)
n=184
n=224
Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Sabotage
Type III
Mean
FSource
Sum of Squares
df
Square
Statistic
Model
212.16
6
35.36
8.39
Intercept
109.44
1
109.44
25.96
GIa
52.00
1
52.00
12.33
Goalb
45.26
1
45.26
10.74
GI * Goalc
2.72
1
2.72
0.65
OutputNumberTotald
15.13
1
15.13
3.59
PreSharede
56.47
1
56.47
13.39
PreEarningf
0.93
1
0.93
0.22
Error
1690.70
401
4.22
Total
2666
408
Panel C: Simple Effects for Each Goal Difficulty Condition
Effect of Pair Identity in the Easy
14.27
1
14.27
2.40
Pair Budget Goal Condition
Effect of Pair Identity in the Difficult
39.82
1
39.82
17.39
Pair Budget Goal Condition
a. GI refers to Pair Identity: Strong Pair Identity vs. Weak Pair Identity.
b. Goal refers to Budget Goal Difficulty: Easy Pair Budget Goal vs. Difficult Pair Budget Goal.
c. GI*Goal is the interaction of the two independent variables.
d. OutputNumberTotal measures the number of codes a participant was working on in each round.
e. PreShared is the points used by the teammate to share keys with a participant in the previous round.
f. PreEarnings is the amount of cash earned by a participant in the previous round.
g. The p-value is one-tailed.

p-value
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01g
0.42
0.06
<0.01
0.64

0.12
<0.01
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Table 6. Bootstrap ANCOVA Results
for H2 and H3 (Sabotage)
Panel A: Bootstrap Results for Sabotage
Type III
Mean
Source
Sum of Squares
df
Square
F-Statistic
Model
212.16
6
35.36
8.39
Intercept
109.44
1
109.44
25.96
GIa
52.00
1
52.00
12.33
Goalb
45.26
1
45.26
10.74
GI * Goalc
2.72
1
2.72
0.65
OutputNumberTotald
15.13
1
15.13
3.59
PreSharede
56.47
1
56.47
13.39
PreEarningf
0.93
1
0.93
0.22
Error
1690.70
401
4.22
Total
2666
408
Panel B: Bootstrap Simple Effects for Each Goal Difficulty Condition
Effect of Pair Identity in the Easy
14.27
1
14.27
2.40
Pair Budget Goal Condition
Effect of Pair Identity in the Difficult
39.82
1
39.82
17.39
Pair Budget Goal Condition

p-value
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01g
0.42
0.06
<0.01
0.64

0.06g
<0.01

a. GI refers to Pair Identity: Strong Pair Identity vs. Weak Pair Identity.
b. Goal refers to Budget Goal Difficulty: Easy Pair Budget Goal vs. Difficult Pair Budget Goal.
c. GI*Goal is the interaction of the two independent variables.
d. OutputNumberTotal measures the number of codes a participant was working on in each round.
e. PreShared is the points used by the teammate to share keys with a participant in the previous round.
f. PreEarnings is the amount of cash earned by a participant in the previous round.
g. The p-value is one-tailed.

Simple effect analysis was conducted to test H3. The results are reported in Panel
C in Table 5 (ANCOVA) and Panel B in Table 6 (Bootstrapped ANCOVA), Table 7
(Multilevel Linear Regression) and Table 8 (Bootstrapped Multilevel Linear Regression).
The results were inconsistent with H3. The p-value reported in all four analyses were
greater than 0.05. The results showed that participants in the Easy Pair Budget Goal
condition sabotaged to a similar extent across the two Pair Identity conditions. The results
suggested that when participants were compensated on both the pair performance and
individual relative performance to other pair members in a situation where the pair goal
was easy to achieve, participants focused on maximizing their economic benefits and
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their behavior was not affected by pair identity. Interestingly, however, the results
suggested that pair identity was effective in the Difficult Pair Budget Goal condition.
Specifically, in this condition, participants in a highly identified pair sabotaged less than
those in a weakly identified pair (F = 17.39, p-value <0.01, reported in Table 3 Panel C; t
= -4.42, p-value < 0.01, reported in Table 7 Panel B). Participants in a highly identified
pair sabotaged about two times less than those in a weakly identified pair (the mean
difference was 0.91, Table 5 Panel A). Taken together, I conclude that H3 is not
supported. However, the effect of pair identity on sabotage was observed in the Difficult
Pair Budget Goal condition.

Table 7. Multilevel Linear Regression Results
for H2 and H3 (Sabotage)
Panel A: Mixed Linear Results for Sabotage
-2 Restricted Log Likelihood: 1760.86

Parameter
Intercept
GIa
Goalb
GI * Goalc
OutputNumberTotald
PreSharede
PreEarningf

Estimate
3.55
-0.56
-0.64
-0.32
-0.01
-0.15
0.01

Std. Error
0.58
0.29
0.34
0.41
0.01
0.04
0.03

df
393.81
398.80
400.06
398.62
393.08
399.95
396.40

t
6.16
-1.95
-1.88
-0.79
-1.94
-3.66
0.50

Panel B: Simple Effects for Each Goal Difficulty Condition
Effect of Group Identity in the Easy
-0.51
0.34
192.43
-1.51
Pair Budget Goal Condition
Effect of Group Identity in the
-0.90
0.20
179.79
-4.42
Difficult Pair Budget Goal Condition
a. GI refers to Group Identity: Strong Pair Identity vs. Weak Pair Identity.
b. Goal refers to Pair Budget Goal Difficulty: Easy Pair Budget Goal vs. Difficult Pair Budget Goal.
c. GI*Goal is the interaction of the two independent variables.
d. OutputNumberTotal measures the number of codes a participant was working on in each round.
e. PreShared is the points used by the teammate to share keys with a participant in the previous round.
f. PreEarnings is the amount of cash earned by a participant in the previous round.
g. The p-value is one-tailed.

p-value
0.00
0.05
0.03g
0.43
0.05
0.00
0.62

0.07g
<0.01
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Table 8. Bootstrap Multilevel Linear Regression Results
for H2 and H3 (Sabotage)
Panel A: Bootstrap Mixed Linear Results for Sabotage
-2 Restricted Log Likelihood: 1762.06
Bootstrap
Parameter
Estimate
Bias
Std. Error
Intercept
3.54
0.02
0.59
GIa
-0.55
-0.01
0.35
Goalb
-0.66
0.00
0.35
GI * Goalc
-0.33
0.00
0.42
OutputNumberTotald
-0.01
0.00
0.01
PreSharede
-0.15
0.00
0.04
PreEarningf
0.01
0.00
0.02
Panel B: Simple Effects for Each Goal Difficulty Condition
Effect of Group Identity in the Easy Pair
-0.53
-0.01
0.35
Budget Goal Condition
Effect of Group Identity in the Difficult
-0.90
0.00
0.22
Pair Budget Goal Condition
a. GI refers to Group Identity: Strong Pair Identity vs. Weak Pair Identity.
b. Goal refers to Pair Budget Goal Difficulty: Easy Pair Budget Goal vs. Difficult Pair Budget Goal.
c. GI*Goal is the interaction of the two independent variables.
d. OutputNumberTotal measures the number of codes a participant was working on in each round.
e. PreShared is the points used by the teammate to share keys with a participant in the previous round.
f. PreEarnings is the amount of cash earned by a participant in the previous round.
g. The p-value is one-tailed.

Easy Pair Budget Goal

Difficult Pair Budget Goal

2.5
2
1.5

2.17

1.61
1.43

1
0.5
0.43
0

Strong Pair Identity

Weak Pair Identity

Figure 2. Sabotage Means Plot

p-value
<0.01
0.11
0.03g
0.43
0.06
<0.01
0.57

0.07g
<0.01
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Tests of H4 (Extra Time)
Hypothesis four focuses on the impact of pair identity on extra time in null form.
The variable, Extra Time, was measured as the points allocated to adding additional time
to one’s own decoding task (up to 10 points and 100 seconds). The findings were
consistent across the statistical methods used. Therefore, I only report the multilevel
linear regression results (Table 9). The control variables were the same as the ones used
in Sharing and Sabotage. I found that the difference in adding extra time was marginally
significant between the Strong Pair Identity condition and the Weak Pair Identity
condition (t = 1.73, p-value = 0.08). On average, participants in a highly identified pair
added seven seconds (17.46 percent) more than those in a weakly identified pair. The
difference was marginally significant in the Easy Pair Budget Goal condition (the
difference was 20.82 percent, p-value = 0.08) and highly significant in the Difficult Pair
Budget Goal condition (the difference was 16.82 percent, p-value < 0.01). Therefore, I
reject the null hypothesis H4, as the results suggest that when the pair budget goal is easy,
enhancing pair identity can motivate participants to spend more time on the decoding
task.
Further, I created another variable, Constructive Effort, which was the sum of
Sharing and Extra Time. This variable represented the effort participants put in to
increasing output. Sabotage, on the other hand, was considered a destructive effort
because it was the effort participants invested to reduce others’ output, in turn reducing
the total pair output. I found in a T-test that, in general, participants invested more
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constructive effort than destructive effort (mean difference = 7.24, t = 33.72, p-value <
0.01).
The finding is reasonable in that if participants were motivated to earn something,
then they needed to put forth effort in order to increase their performance. They would
never reduce more output than they produced. The destructive effort was used as a
supplemental strategy to maximize personal utility. Interestingly, I found that there were
cases where participants were altruistic in that they would share keys to increase their
teammate’s chance of winning the bigger compensation. Specifically, one participant
commented in the post-questionnaire that “I shared my keys with my teammate in order
to give [him/her] a higher chance of winning.”
I also found that there were some rounds in which participants both shared keys
with–and sabotaged–their teammate. This finding indicated that cooperation and
competition are not mutually exclusive. However, these two strategies are supplementary
in maximizing personal economic utility. For example, the cases where sharing and
sabotage were simultaneously observed represented 40.91% of the observations in the
easy pair budget goal and weak pair identity condition, 33.67% in the easy pair budget
goal and strong pair identity condition, 35.42% in the difficult pair budget goal and weak
pair identity condition, and 18.27% in the difficult pair budget goal and strong pair
identity condition. In particular, two participants left comments in the post-questionnaire
that “… [a]llocate points in the beginning to sharing to let counterpart ease their guard,
then stop doing so and focus on reducing their points to maximize individual reward.”
and that “… I wanted to be nice and share at least one key [with] my partner, and I
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usually took at least one code away from my partner just to give me a slight chance to
win the bigger prize, … .”
Table 9. Multilevel Linear Regression Results
for H4 (Extra Time)
Panel A: Four-round Aggregate Mean for Extra Time
Weak Group
Strong Group
Identity
Identity
Easy Pair Budget Goal
3.65
4.41
(2.56)
(2.44)
n=88
n=120
Difficult Pair Budget Goal
4.34
5.07
(2.82)
(2.81)
n=96
n=104
Marginal
4.01
4.71
(2.72)
(2.63)
n=184
n=224
Panel B: Mixed Linear Results for Extra Time
-2 Restricted Log Likelihood: 1761.25
Parameter
Estimate
Std. Error
df
Intercept
-4.11
0.58
391.51
GIa
0.50
0.29
399.28
Goalb
-0.23
0.34
399.63
GI * Goalc
0.36
0.41
399.29
OutputNumberTotald
0.10
0.01
388.60
PreSharede
0.17
0.04
400.33
PreEarningf
-0.06
0.03
387.61
Panel C: Simple Effects for Each Goal Difficulty Condition
Effect of Group Identity in the Easy
0.49
0.28
198.03
Pair Budget Goal Condition
Effect of Group Identity in the
0.86
0.30
194.92
Difficult Pair Budget Goal Condition

Marginal
4.09
(2.52)
n=208
4.72
(2.83)
n=200

t
-7.14
1.73
-0.66
0.88
16.19
4.32
-2.35

p-value
<0.01
0.08
0.51
0.38
<0.01
<0.01
0.02

1.75

0.08

2.91

<0.01

a. GI refers to Group Identity: Strong Group Identity vs. Weak Group Identity.
b. Goal refers to Budget Goal Difficulty: Easy Pair Budget Goal vs. Difficult Pair Budget Goal.
c. GI*Goal is the interaction of the two independent variables.
d. OutputNumberTotal measures the number of codes a participant was working on in each round.
e. PreShared is the points used by the teammate to share keys with a participant in the previous round.
f. PreEarnings is the amount of cash earned by a participant in the previous round.

60

Easy Pair Budget Goal

Difficult Pair Budget Goal

6
5.07
5
4

4.34
4.41
3.65

3
2
1
0

Strong Pair Identity

Weak Pair Identity

Figure 3. Extra Time Means Plot

Tests of H5 and H6 (Productivity)
Hypothesis H5 predicts that output is higher in the strong pair identity condition
than in the weak pair identity condition. This hypothesis was examined at both the
individual level and the pair level. At the individual level, the dependent variable of
interest was Individual Output, which was measured as a participant’s actual number of
letter combinations successfully decoded in each round subtracting the number of
combinations reduced (sabotaged) by the teammate.
The ANOVA results (Table 10 Panel B) indicates that enhancing pair identity
would marginally affect participants’ productivity (p-value = 0.07, one-tailed).
Specifically, participants in the Strong Pair Identity condition decoded about two units
(4.10 percent) more than those in the Weak Pair Identity condition. Breaking the results
into a more detailed level, I found that the effect of pair identity on individual output was
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significant in the Easy Pair Budget Goal condition (F = 2.96, p-value = 0.05, one-tailed,
Table 10 Panel C). Specifically, in the Easy Pair Budget Goal condition, participants in a
highly identified pair, on average, decoded about four units (8.11%) more than those in a
weakly identified pair. However, the pair identity effect on individual output was trivial
in the Difficult Pair Budget Goal condition (p-value = 0.33, one-tailed). The results were
consistent with the findings in the bootstrapped ANOVA (Table 11), the multilevel linear
regression (Table 12), and the bootstrapped multilevel linear regression (Table 13). The
pair identity effect was not significant in the Difficult Pair Budget Goal condition. This
may be because of a ceiling effect. That is, the difficult goal had made the participants
reach the limit of their ability in the decoding task. Therefore, adding one other piece of
incentive (pair identity) did not affect participant performance significantly.
Next, I examined the difference in productivity at the pair level using Pair Output,
which is the sum of the two participants’ Individual Output in each pair, the total actual
number of letter combinations successfully decoded by the two participants in a pair each
round minus the total units sabotaged by each other in that round. Because each
participant in a pair has the same value for the variable, I used only one observation in
each pair per round. To keep the analysis consistent with those outlinedabove, the firstround data was not included in the formal analysis. This process reduced the sample size
to 204.
Panel A in Table 14 shows that on average pairs in the Strong Pair Identity
condition decoded about 4 units (4.10 percent) more than those in the Weak Pair Identity
condition. The formal ANOVA results (Table 14 Panel B) indicated that this difference
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was marginally significant (F = 2.49, p-value = 0.06, one-tailed). The simple effect
reported in Table 14 Panel C provided evidence that the effect of pair identity is
significant in the Easy Pair Budget Goal condition (F = 3.52, p-value = 0.03, one-tailed)
but not in the Difficult Pair Budget Goal condition (F = 0.21, p-value = 0.33, one-tailed).
The bootstrap ANOVA provided the same results. Therefore, it was not reported. In the
Easy Pair Budget Goal condition, highly identified pairs decoded, on average, about eight
units (8.11%) more than weakly identified pairs.
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Figure 4. Individual Output Means Plot
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Table 10. ANOVA Test
for H5 and H6 - Individual Level
Panel A: Four-round Aggregate Mean for Individual Output
Weak Pair
Strong Pair
Identity
Identity
Marginal
46.24
49.99
48.40
Easy Pair Budget Goal
(16.16)
(15.08)
(15.62)
n=88
n=120
n=208
54.01
55.08
54.57
Difficult Pair Budget Goal
(17.45)
(16.67)
(17.01)
n=96
n=104
n=200
50.29
52.35
Marginal
(17.24)
(16.01)
n=184
n=224
Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Individual Output
Type III
Mean
FSource
Sum of Squares
df
Square
Statistic
Model
4642.29
3
1547.43
5.82
Intercept
1061071.56
1
1061071.56 3993.85
GIa
584.66
1
584.66
2.20
Goalb
4160.77
1
4160.77
15.66
GI * Goalc
181.67
1
181.67
0.68
Error
107333.35
404
265.68
Total
1190903
408
Panel C: Simple Effects for Each Goal Difficulty Condition
Effect of Pair Identity in the Easy
715.10
1
715.10
2.96
Pair Budget Goal Condition
Effect of Pair Identity in the Difficult
Pair Budget Goal Condition

56.78

1

56.78

0.20

a. GI refers to Pair Identity: Strong Pair Identity vs. Weak Pair Identity.
b. Goal refers to Budget Goal Difficulty: Easy Pair Budget Goal vs. Difficult Pair Budget Goal.
c. GI*Goal is the interaction of the two independent variables.
d. The p-value is one-tailed.

p-value
<0.01
<0.01
0.07d
<0.01d
0.41

0.05d
0.33d
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Table 11. Bootstrap ANOVA Results
for H5 and H6 - Individual Level
Panel A: Bootstrap Results for Individual Output
Type III
Mean
Source
Sum of Squares
df
Square
F-Statistic
Model
4642.29
3
1547.43
5.82
Intercept
1061071.56
1
1061071.56
3993.85
GIa
584.66
1
584.66
2.20
Goalb
4160.77
1
4160.77
15.66
GI * Goalc
181.67
1
181.67
0.68
Error
107333.35
404
265.68
Total
1190903
408
Panel B: Bootstrap Simple Effects for Each Goal Difficulty Condition
Effect of Pair Identity in the Easy Pair
715.10
1
715.10
2.96
Budget Goal Condition
Effect of Pair Identity in the Difficult
56.78
1
56.78
0.20
Pair Budget Goal Condition
a. GI refers to Pair Identity: Strong Pair Identity vs. Weak Pair Identity.
b. Goal refers to Budget Goal Difficulty: Easy Pair Budget Goal vs. Difficult Pair Budget Goal.
c. GI*Goal is the interaction of the two independent variables.
d. The p-value is one-tailed.

p-value
<0.01
<0.01
0.07d
<0.01d
0.41

0.05d
0.33d
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Table 12. Multilevel Linear Regression Results
for H5 and H6 - Individual Level
Panel A: Mixed Linear Results for Individual Output
-2 Restricted Log Likelihood: 3308.47

Parameter
Intercept
GIa
Goalb
GI * Goalc
OutputNumberTotald
PreEarninge

Estimate
14.88
3.04
11.41
-2.44
0.29
0.91

Std. Error
3.23
1.94
2.26
2.76
0.04
0.17

df
366.10
372.26
367.28
371.72
375.13
382.60

t
4.61
1.57
5.05
-0.88
7.84
5.26

Panel B: Simple Effects for Each Goal Difficulty Condition
Effect of Group Identity in the Easy
3.37
1.91
185.82
1.77
Pair Budget Goal Condition
Effect of Group Identity in the
0.77
1.96
178.99
0.39
Difficult Pair Budget Goal Condition

p-value
0.00
0.06f
<0.01f
0.38
<0.01
<0.01

0.04f
0.35f

a. GI refers to Group Identity: Strong Pair Identity vs. Weak Pair Identity.
b. Goal refers to Pair Budget Goal Difficulty: Easy Pair Budget Goal vs. Difficult Pair Budget Goal.
c. GI*Goal is the interaction of the two independent variables.
d. OutputNumberTotal measures the number of codes a participant was working on in each round.
e. PreEarnings is the amount of cash earned by a participant in the previous round.
f. The p-value is one-tailed.

Table 13. Bootstrap Multilevel Mixed Linear Regression Results
for H5 and H6 - Individual Level
Panel A: Bootstrap Mixed Linear Results for Individual
-2 Restricted Log Likelihood: 3420.22
Bootstrap
Parameter
Estimate
Bias
Std. Error
Intercept
55.08
0.01
1.63
GIa
-1.07
-0.03
2.44
Goalb
-5.09
0.00
2.15
GI * Goalc
-2.69
0.01
3.27
Panel B: Simple Effects for Each Goal Difficulty Condition
Effect of Group Identity in the Easy
-3.75
-0.04
2.20
Pair Goal Condition
Effect of Group Identity in the
-1.07
-0.01
2.39
Difficult Pair Budget Goal Condition
a. GI refers to Group Identity: Strong Group Identity vs. Weak Group Identity.
b. Goal refers to Budget Goal Difficulty: Easy Pair Budget Goal vs. Difficult Pair Budget Goal.
c. GI*Goal is the interaction of the two independent variables.
d. The p-value is one-tailed.

p-value
<0.01
0.33d
0.01d
0.42

0.05d
0.33d
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Table 14. ANOVA Results
for H5 and H6 - Pair Level
Panel A: Four-round Aggregate Mean for Pair Output
Weak Pair
Strong Pair
Identity
Identity
Marginal
92.48
99.98
96.81
Easy Pair Budget Goal
(19.35)
(20.73)
(20.41)
n=44
n=60
n=104
108.02
110.15
109.13
Difficult Pair Budget Goal
(21.89)
(24.21)
(23.03)
n=48
n=52
n=100
100.59
104.71
Marginal
(22.03)
(22.88)
n=92
n=112

Source
Model
Intercept
GIa
Goalb
GI * Goalc
Error
Total

Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Pair Output
Type III
Mean
Sum of Squares
df
Square
9284.58
3
3094.86
2122143.13
1
2122143.13
1169.32
1
1169.32
8321.54
1
8321.54
363.33
1
363.33
93869.71
200
469.35
2261009
204

FStatistic
6.59
4521.47
2.49
17.73
0.77

Panel C: Simple Effects for Each Goal Difficulty Condition
Effect of Pair Identity in the Easy Pair
1430.19
1
1430.19
3.52
Budget Goal Condition
Effect of Pair Identity in the Difficult
113.56
1
113.56
0.21
Pair Budget Goal Condition

p-value
<0.01
<0.01
0.06d
<0.01d
0.38

0.03d
0.33d

a. GI refers to Pair Identity: Strong Pair Identity vs. Weak Pair Identity.
b. Goal refers to Budget Goal Difficulty: Easy Pair Budget Goal vs. Difficult Pair Budget Goal.
c. GI*Goal is the interaction of the two independent variables.
d. The p-value is one-tailed.

I used Pair Output in the multilevel linear regression model at only one level, the
pair level, to avoid a round effect. The results using this method and bootstrap multilevel
linear regression were similar. Because the dependent variable violated normality, I
reported only the bootstrapped results in Table 15. The findings were consistent with
those in Table 14 using the same dependent variable. In addition, the findings using
individual output and using pair output were consistent. These results show that
hypothesis H5 is marginally supported. The simple effect analysis suggests that when the
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pair budget goal was easy, strengthening pair identity could improve productivity. The
finding that pair identity in the Difficult Pair Budget Goal condition was trivial may be
because the hard goal made the participants work at their highest ability level, reaching
the upper limit of their ability. Therefore, an additional motivation for improving
productivity is not effective in such scenarios.
Hypothesis H6 predicts that output will be higher in the Difficult Pair Budget
Goal condition than in the Easy Pair Budget Goal condition. This hypothesis was also
examined at both the individual level and the pair level. At the individual level, the
ANOVA results (Table 10 Panel B) indicates that setting a difficult pair budget goal
would significantly affect participants’ productivity (p-value = 0.01, one-tailed).
Specifically, participants in the Difficult Pair Budget Goal condition decoded about six
units (12.75 percent) more than those in the Easy Pair Budget Goal condition. The results
were consistent with the findings in the bootstrapped ANOVA (Table 11), the multilevel
linear regression (Table 12), and the bootstrapped multilevel linear regression (Table 13).
At the Pair level, Panel A in Table 14 shows that on average pairs in the Difficult
Pair Budget Goal condition decoded about 12 units (12.73 percent) more than those in the
Easy Pair Budget Goal condition. The formal ANOVA results (Table 14 Panel B)
indicated that this difference was significant (F = 17.73, p-value < 0.01, one-tailed). The
non-reported bootstrap ANOVA provided the same results.
With these results I conclude that hypothesis H6 is supported, suggesting that
increasing pair budget goal difficulty can enhance productivity.
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Figure 5. Pair Output Means Plot

Table 15. Bootstrap Multilevel Linear Regression
for H5 and H6 - Pair Level
Panel A: Bootstrap Mixed Linear Results for Pair Output
-2 Restricted Log Likelihood: 1762.06
Bootstrap
Parameter
Estimate
Bias
Std. Error
Intercept
56.85
0.00
6.59
GIa
6.29
-0.02
4.05
Goalb
13.18
0.05
4.30
GI * Goalc
-3.29
0.05
5.80
PairTotalNumberd
0.23
0.00
0.04
Panel B: Simple Effects for Each Goal Difficulty Condition
Effect of Group Identity in the Easy Pair
6.83
0.05
3.91
Budget Goal Condition
Effect of Group Identity in the Difficult
3.47
0.06
4.10
Pair Budget Goal Condition
a. GI refers to Group Identity: Strong Group Identity vs. Weak Group Identity.
b. Goal refers to Budget Goal Difficulty: Easy Pair Budget Goal vs. Difficult Pair Budget Goal.
c. GI*Goal is the interaction of the two independent variables.
d. PairTotalNumber measures the number of codes a pair was working on in each round.
It is the sum of OutputNumberTotal of the two participants in each pair.
e. The p-value is one-tailed.

p-value
<0.01
0.06e
<0.01e
0.58
<0.01

0.04e
0.20e
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Additional Analysis (Causality test)
The findings above indicated that pair identity improves participant performance
through different vehicles. Specifically, in the Difficult Pair Budget Goal condition, the
results suggested that pair identity did not affect participant performance. In the Easy Pair
Budget Goal condition, the findings indicated that strong pair identity motivates
participants to work longer and, in turn, increase output. However, analysis of variances
only tests the mean difference across conditions. The causality between the independent
variables and dependent variables is not assured. Therefore, in this section, I reported the
results of a path model, which tests the causality of the variables. This analysis helps
improve understanding of the mechanism through which pair identity has a positive effect
on participant performance.
The test was conducted using the process macro (Hayes 2017), designed
specifically for moderation and mediation effect test by Dr. Andrew Hayes. This macro is
suitable for my data because it is based on bootstrapping methodology, which does not
assume normality, and several variables in my data were not normally distributed. The
findings were consistent with results obtained using a Structural Equation Model (SEM).
Due to the limitation of nonnormality, the bootstrapped results were considered robust.
Therefore, SEM results are not reported here.
To ensure consistency in my analysis, first round data was not used in the
analysis. Since the effect of pair identity on individual output and on pair output were
similar, I used Individual Output as the dependent variable to maintain sample size and
power. The independent variable was Pair Identity (0 indicating weak identity, 1
indicating strong identity). The mediators were: 1. Shared: the points used by the
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teammate to share keys with a participant; 2. Extra Time: the points used by a participant
to work extra time on his/her own decoding task; 3. Sabotaged,: the points used by the
teammate to reduce a participant’s output in the decoding task. The analysis was
conducted separately for the Easy Pair Budget Goal condition and the Difficult Pair
Budget Goal condition. The results are presented in Table 17. The regression coefficients
are reported in Panel A. The path effects are reported in Panel B. As shown in Panel B,
the direct effect of pair identity on output was not significant (the 95% confidence
interval contains zero). Therefore, there was no direct effect of pair identity on
productivity. This finding was true for both the Easy Pair Budget Goal condition and the
Difficult Pair Budget Goal condition.
Further, I found that pair identity increased productivity via different means in the
two budget difficulty conditions. Specifically, in the Easy Pair Budget Goal condition,
the only significant path was Pair Identity on Individual Output through Extra Time. This
result suggested that in this condition, forming a highly identified pair would encourage
participants to work longer on their own task to increase output. This finding is consistent
with a prior argument that introducing pair identity effects maintains in-group
competition while discouraging sabotage (Charness et al. 2014). Two post-experiment
questionnaire items measured participant perception of task competitiveness. I used the
average score of the two items to proxy for task competitiveness. It indicated that
participants in the easy goal condition considered the task to be relatively more
competitive (mean 3.57 vs. 2.93, t = 1.67, p-value = 0.10).
In the Difficult Pair Budget Goal condition, the only significant path was Pair
Identity on Individual Output through Sabotaged. This effect meant that in a highly
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identified pair, participants were sabotaged by their teammates less than those in a
weakly identified pair, resulting in higher productivity. Though the findings in the
previous section showed participants worked longer when pair identity was strong than
when it was weak, Table 17 provided evidence that when pair budget goals were difficult
to achieve, highly identified pairs improve their productivity via sabotaging less. This
finding suggests that when pair goals were difficult, participants may have worked at a
level close to their limits (the constructive effort), which meant it was very difficult for
them to increase their output. Therefore, sabotaging less could help them preserve more
output to achieve the pair budget goal. Strong pair identity simply made such a strategy
more evident.

Table 16. Bootstrap Path Analysis Results
for Causality Test
Panel A: Bootstrap Results for Regression Model Parameters
Easy Goal
Hard Goal
Dependent
Independent
Variables
Variables
Coef. SE
95% CI
Coef. SE
95% CI
Shared
GI
-0.28 0.42 -1.09 0.54
0.19 0.41 -0.62 1.00
Extra Time
GI
0.76 0.35 0.06 1.45
0.73 0.39 -0.03 1.51
Sabotaged
GI
-0.56 0.35 -1.26 0.12 -0.91 0.22 -1.36 -0.49
Individual Output GI
0.92 1.95 -2.79 4.85 -2.54 2.31 -6.86 2.21
Individual Output Shared
1.06 0.37 0.36 1.83
1.93 0.37 1.19 2.66
Individual Output Extra Time
2.09 0.46 1.14 2.92
2.54 0.41 1.72 3.32
Individual Output Sabotaged
-2.75 0.52 -3.79 -1.72 -1.55 0.63 -2.68 -2.16
Panel B: Analysis of Direct and Indirect Effects
Easy Goal
Hard Goal
Path
Coef. SE
95% CI
Coef. SE
95% CI
GI → Individual Output (Direct)
0.92 1.95 -2.79 4.85 -2.54 2.31 -6.86 2.21
GI → Shared → Individual Output
-0.3 0.47 -1.33 0.59
0.36 0.81 -1.23 1.97
GI → Extra Time → Individual Output
1.84 1.05 -0.9
4.01
1.59 0.84 0.10 3.37
GI → Sabotaged → Individual Output
1.54 1.04 -0.33 3.75
1.41 0.64 0.19 2.68

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This study focuses on the effects of pair budget goal difficulty and pair identity on
ingroup member behaviors and performance. Teamwork plays an important role in
modern business operations. Hence, designing an effective incentive scheme to motivate
teamwork is essential to business success. The literature shows that group-based
incentives lead to greater cooperation than other incentive structures. However, the
downside of implementing such incentives in organizations is that it creates a free-riding
issue, such that individuals benefit from other group members’ effort. One way to reduce
the free-riding issue is to add a tournament incentive to group-based incentive plans. That
is, to compensate the group members using a mixed incentives scheme. The benefit of
using mixed incentives is that the advantages of one incentive can overcome the
disadvantage of the other one. However, the mixed incentives scheme creates a social
dilemma such that when facing multiple goals people are confused about which goal they
should pursue first. This issue can make the mixed incentives ineffective to shape
individuals’ behavior and effort in a workgroup setting.
This study investigates the mechanism through which people value group
performance more than individual performance using an economic factor and a
psychological factor, pair budget goal difficulty and pair identity, respectively. I find that
when participants faced a difficult pair budget goal, they cooperated more than when
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they faced an easy pair budget goal. I also find that they sabotaged less when they are
assigned a difficult pair budget goal than when they are assigned an easy pair budget
goal. Further, I find that assigned a difficult pair budget goal, individuals in highly
identified pairs sabotaged less than those in weakly identified pairs. Additionally,
assigning a difficult goal can significantly increase team performance. However, the
effect of pair identity on performance is only marginally significant in the easy budget
goal condition. Moreover, I find the causality of the relation between pair identity and
performance is different between easy goals and difficult goals. Specifically, in the easy
goal condition, strong pair identity influenced participants to increase performance
through working longer. In the difficult goal condition, strong pair identity influenced
participants to increase performance by reducing sabotage.
This study provides insights for both theory and practice. From a theoretical
standpoint, this study investigates the interaction between psychology and economics,
showing that psychological concepts and economic theories are complementary to
understanding human behaviors in a social dilemma setting. This study contributes to this
stream of literature by showing that economic and psychological factors may affect the
effectiveness of economic incentives. Specifically, when individuals face conflicts of
interest, pair budget goal difficulty and the strength of pair identity play important roles
in aligning individual interests with the interests of the organization.
Second, this study extends the goal-setting literature by investigating the effect of
pair goals on individual behaviors. Prior goal setting literature has provided evidence
about the effect of goal difficulty on effort and performance at the individual level.
However, little is known about the effects of goal difficulty on individual strategic
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behaviors at the group level, especially when group members face conflicts of interest.
This research provides evidence that participants focused more on the group goal than the
individual goal when a difficult group budget goal is assigned, and that group members
behave cooperatively to achieve the group goal first.
Third, this study adds to the group identity literature by examining the effect of
group identity on cooperation and sabotage simultaneously. Prior literature provides
evidence that individuals in a highly identified group value their own group more than
other groups. Individuals in a highly identified group behave cooperatively because they
have concern for others. However, the literature overlooks the effectiveness of group
identity in a social dilemma scenario. That is, when group members face conflicts of
interest, it is not known whether strong group identity can make one interest more salient
than another and, therefore, induce more cooperation in the group. This study adds to the
literature by showing that group identity is useful in improving performance. However,
group identity cannot work alone on performance improvement. The effectiveness of
group identity depends on other factors, such as goal difficulty.
Finally, the evidence is mixed that mixed incentives, which include both a groupbased incentive and a tournament incentive, are effective to motivate employee behavior
and promote performance. Proponents argue that the advantages of the group and
individual incentive elements can overcome the disadvantages of the two elements in
mixed incentive models. Opponents suggest that providing conflicts of interest create a
social dilemma in which employees are not sure about which interest to pursue first. This
study provides evidence that the effectiveness of mixed incentives depends on other
factors and suggests that organizations who would like to use mixed incentives to
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promote group work may use them with caution in that using mixed incentives alone may
cause detrimental effects to the organization. This study shows that enhancing group
identity or setting difficult group budget goals can increase group performance in mixed
incentives settings.

Limitations and Future Research Opportunities
This study has several limitations that provide opportunities for future research.
First, in this study, I examined the effects of the two factors under only one type of mixed
incentives. Future research can examine the validity of the findings in different mixed
incentives settings. Second, the experiment was conducted over a short period of time.
The findings may not hold for a long-term effect. Third, the effect of group identity is
found to be moderated by goal difficulty. Are there other factors that could moderate
group identity effects on performance, e.g., prize spread? Fourth, the effects of the two
factors were only investigated in a mixed incentives situation. Are mixed incentives more
efficient than other incentives after incorporating the two factors? Fifth, a participant
indicated that he/she wanted to help their teammate have a greater chance of winning.
What caused the participant to do so? Sixth, participants in this study worked only on a
single task. It is not uncommon in most workplace settings for employees to work on
multiple tasks simultaneously, which may vary from individual tasks to group tasks. Will
group identity affect behavior in such settings and improve productivity?

APPENDIX A
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Slogan Guessing Task Instrument
Slogan Guessing Competition with answers
Team Name:
Worker ID:

Date:
Worker ID:

#1 "Taste the Feeling"
Company/Product:

Session:

Coca Cola

#2 “Designed For Driving Pleasure”
Company/Product:

BMW

#3 “Breakfast of champions”
Company/Product:

Wheaties

#4 “Just do it”
Company/Product:

Nike

#5 “Melts in your mouth, not in your hand”
Company/Product:
M&M
#6 “Save money. Live better”
Company/Product:

Walmart

#7 “The best a man can get”
Company/Product:

Gillette

#8 “Can You hear Me Now”
Company/Product:

Verizon

#9 “Taste the one that’s forever young.”
Company/Product:

Pepsi

#10 “Eat Fresh”
Company/Product:
Subway
#11 “What happens here stays here”
Company/Product: Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority
#12 “Zoom-Zoom.”
Company/Product:
Mazda
#13 “When you care enough to send the very best.”
Company/Product:
Hallmark
#14 “Betcha Can’t eat just one”
Company/Product:
#15 “Don’t leave home without it”
Company/Product:
#16 “the happiest place on earth”
Company/Product:
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Lay’s
American Express
Disneyland
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Scales Measure for Pair Identity Manipulation
Please circle the number to indicate your level of agreement to the following questions.
1 ––– 2 ––– 3 ––– 4 ––– 5 ––– 6 ––– 7
Definitely

Definitely

No

Yes

1. Are you happy to be a part of your team?
2. Do you feel that you are a member of the team?
3. Do you like your teammate?
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Experimental Script – Strong Pair Identity
<Participants arrive>
Put up a sign ----- Please DO NOT communicate with other people.
“First of all, I’d like to thank you for participating today. Please read and sign the consent
form in front of you and keep a copy for your records. If you have any questions about
the consent form, please raise your hand. Today’s session will begin shortly.”
<Collect signed consent forms.>
<Explain how the information collected will be used later.>
“Today, you will be doing two tasks. Now I will let each one of you draw a number,
which you will be using as your worker ID number throughout today’s session. By using
this number, your performance today can be kept confidential. Individual information
will only be seen by the researcher and will only be released in aggregate format. If you
have any questions during the instruction, please raise your hand.”
<Slogan guessing game>
<High Identity – team formation>
“Now, based on the number you chose, you are going to form teams of two. Please look
at the back of your worker ID. It tells you which team you are in. So please find your
teammate and sit together. Once you find your teammate, please do not communicate yet.
Please wait for further instructions. Thanks for your cooperation.”
<Hand out the T-shirts.>
“Now, you have successfully found your teammate. Please put on the T-shirt in front of
you.”
“Now you need to work with your teammate to create and write down a unique team
name on the paper in front of you. You will be using your individual worker ID and the
team name throughout today’s session.”
<Slogan guessing game starts>
“Your job now is to work with your teammate to guess 16 product slogans. You and your
teammate need to write down the names of companies or products you believe are
79
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associated with the slogans. You and your teammate have to reach an agreement on the
answer. Then write the answer on the line below the slogans.”
<Hand out the example --- one copy for each team >
For example, if the slogan is “What’s The Worst That could Happen?” you and your
teammate agree that this is a slogan of Dr. Pepper, then please write down “Dr. Pepper”
on the line below the slogan.”
“Do you have any questions?”
<Explain the compensation of the game>
“At the end of today’s session, the winning team will be announced. In this competition,
the team with the highest number of correct answers is the winner. If there is a tie, then
those teams will compete on guessing more slogans until one team wins out. The winning
team will receive a bag of candy as the award.”
“Your team has 10 minutes to complete the task. You can communicate with your
teammate during this task.”
“Do you have any questions about the first task?”
<Hand out the slogan-guessing materials>
“Please open the material and start the task now.”
<When the slogan guessing game finish>
“Time is up. Please stop. Now please make sure you have written down your worker ID
and your team name on the task sheet and wait for the helper to collect your answers.”
“The helper will check the answers, and the winning team will be announced at the end
of today’s session.”
<Hand out GI manipulation check>
“Please fill out this short questionnaire. There are no right or wrong answers. Just answer
these questions honestly.”
<Collect the manipulation check> <Start decoding task>
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Experimental Script ---- Decoding Task
(Strong Pair Identity)
<Decoding task>
“Please do not talk with others during this task. If you have any questions during the
instructions, please raise your hand.”
“In this session you will act as a program tester for Beta company.”
“Beta company designs large computer programs. You have been hired as part of a team
that will be testing part of a program. The program involves extensive decoding
activities. To test the performance of the program, your team’s job is to decode letters
into numbers for a number of work periods. The goal is to correctly decode as many
letters as your team can in a given period of time.”
“At the end of each work period, a machine will record the number of letters correctly
decoded. This amount is your recorded output for the period.”
“However, because of a design flaw, there is a 5% chance that you might lose up to 20
units output each period from measurement error.”
“Do you have any questions so far?”
“Please click the ‘Proceed’ button on the screen.”
<Explain the task>
“To test the new program, you and your teammate each will be given a different list of
five numerical keys to decode two-letter combinations for several work periods.”
“The screen in front of you is an example of the decoding task. (Figure 1)”
“The top left corner shows your team name and your worker ID throughout today’s task.
The very top right corner shows the remaining time for the period. The top shows your
team output goal for the period. The box on the left-hand side is the list of numerical keys
to decode the combinations. The task box in the middle is where you perform the
decoding task. It shows you the period, and combination to decode. The box on the righthand side shows the number of combinations you decode correctly.
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“For example, the key list has a key of 74 for the two-letter combination “CZ” and a key
of 23 for the two-letter combination “RI,” and a key of 98 for the two-letter combination
“TB.”
“In the task box, if you see a combination from your key list, then you type in the
corresponding key in the blue box and click “OK.” If you see a combination which is not
on your key list, then you click “OK” directly. If you don’t want do work on the decoding
task for the period, then you can click on the “I am done with the period” button on the
bottom right corner. Then you can do something else until the next period starts.
However, if you do click the button, you need to remain in your seat and remain silent.”
“If you have any questions, please raise your hand.”
“Now please click the “proceed” button on the bottom left corner.”
<Explain the decision report (Figure 2)>
“Each work period lasts 3 minutes. Before you perform the decoding task, you need to
make a decision about how you would like to perform the task.”
“The screen in front of you now is an example of a decision-making report.”
“This screen shows your team name and your worker ID throughout today’s task. The
very top right corner shows the remaining time for the period. The top shows your team
output goal for the period.”
“The box in the middle of the screen is a decision-making box.”
<Alternative 1 – sharing keys>
“At the start of each work period, you will be given a list of 5 numerical keys and 10
points to allocate between 3 alternatives. For each two points you allocate to alternative
1, you will share 1 of your personal keys with your teammate.”
“For example, if you allocate 4 points to alternative 1, then you will share 2 of your
personal keys with your teammate. The keys shared by your teammate will also appear
on your key list under the five of your personal keys. The more keys you have, the more
combinations you can decode. All keys are only valid for the current period.”
“Do you have any questions?”
<Alternative 2 ----- additional work time>
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“For each point you allocate to alternative 2, you yourself will receive an additional 10
seconds to do the decoding task. That is, if you allocate 1 point to alternative 2, then you
but not your teammate will have 3 minutes and 10 seconds in total to decode the
combinations. If you allocate the total 10 points to alternative 2, then you have 4 minutes
and 40 seconds in total to do the decoding task. If you allocate 0 points to alternative 2,
then you have 5 minutes to do the decoding task.”
<Alternative 3 ------ sabotage>
“For each point you allocate to alternative 3, you will reduce your teammate’s final
recorded output by 2 units. For example, if your teammate’s recorded output is 95 units
for the period, and you allocated 1 point to alternative 3, then your teammate’s recorded
output will be reduced to 93 units. If you allocated the total 10 points to alternative 3,
then your teammate’s recorded output will be reduced to 73. However, there is no way
you can be certain of your teammate’s decision, or for your teammate to be certain of
your decisions, because any loss of reported output may solely to measurement error by
the system. After you complete the decision report and click the “submit” button, the
decoding task period begins.”
“You must use all 10 points among the three alternatives. The points may not be carried
forward to future rounds.”
“You will be given a list of five new numerical keys and 10 points at the start of each
period. Hence you need to fill out a decision report at the beginning of each new period.”
“The goal of the company in this task is to decode as many letter combinations as
possible. At the start of each period, you will be notified of your team output goal set by
the company for the period.” In each practice period and main period, the program
generates only 100 combinations. That is, you will only see 100 combinations at most in
each period including both the combinations on your key list and the ones not on your
key list. Your period ends when you reach the 100th combination or when the time runs
out, whichever comes first.”

“Do you have any questions?” “Please use this screen to practice points allocation.”
<Feedback - Figure 3>
“At the end of each period, you will receive a performance report. The report shows your
team name, your worker id, your team goal, whether your team final recorded output
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meets the team goal for the period, your personal final recorded output, and the amount
you are paid for the period.”
<Compensation>
“Your compensation for each period is based on your team total recorded output (the sum
of your recorded output and your teammate’s recorded output) and your recorded output
relative to your teammate’s recorded output. When your team final recorded output is at
or above the team goal, you and your teammate each will be paid 5 U.S. dollars. In
addition, the person with the higher final recorded output will receive an additional 7
U.S. dollars as a bonus. The person with the lower final recorded output will receive an
additional 3 U.S. dollars as a bonus. For example, if your team for the period is to
correctly decode 120 units, and your team final recorded output is 130 units, then each
one of you will receive a payment of 5 U.S. dollars. On top of that, if your final recorded
output is 70 units, and your teammate’s final recorded output is 60 units, then you will
receive additional 7 U.S. dollars, and your teammate will receive additional 3 U.S. dollars
for the period. That is, when the team goal is achieved, the person with relatively higher
final recorded output will be paid 12 U.S. dollars, and the person with relatively lower
final recorded output will be paid 8 U.S. dollars. You can increase your personal output
to earn the higher reward by either increasing your own output or decreasing your
teammate’s output. If your team final recorded output is 110 units, then both you and
your teammate will be paid zero U.S. dollars. You can share keys with your teammate to
increase your team’s output.”
“At the end of the session today, one of the work periods will be randomly selected as the
payment period.”
<Task-understanding questions>
“If you don’t have any questions, please click the “proceed” button to 8 questions on the
screen.”
<Type in Worker ID and Team Name>
“Now please click the “Proceed” button to type in your worker ID and Team Name on
the screen. Please raise your hand when you finish.”
<Practice periods>
“Before the actual task, you will have two practice periods to help you understand the
task. For simplicity, you are not allowed to share keys or allocate points in practice
periods.”
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“Each practice period lasts 3 minutes. If you have any questions, please ask before each
practice period starts.”
“In each practice period and main period, the program generates only 100 combinations.
That is, you will only see 100 combinations at most in each period including both the
combinations on your key list and the ones not on your key list. Your period ends when
you reach the 100th combination or when the time runs out, whichever comes first.”
“Do you have any questions?
“Please click the “proceed” bottom” to start the practice.”
<Task completed>
“Please do not communicate with other people in any form about this study.”
<Announce the winners of the slogan guessing game. And pay the winner>
<If there is a tie in the winners, continue another round of the game (2 mins)>
<Announce the winners>
<After collecting all the materials.>
“Thank you again for participating in the study. Today’s session is over now. You all
have a good day!”
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Screen Shot for Decoding Task

Figure 6. Sample of Decoding Task – Task Page
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Figure 7. Sample of Decoding Task – Decision Making Page
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Figure 8. Sample of Decoding Task – Feedback Page
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Please circle the number to indicate your level of agreement to the following questions.
1 ––– 2 ––– 3 ––– 4 ––– 5 ––– 6 ––– 7
Definitely
No
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Definitely
Yes

I am happy to be a part of my team. [pair identity]
I feel I am a member of my team. [pair identity]
I like my teammate. [pair identity]
The team output goal was hard to achieve. [budget difficulty]
I had to work hard to meet the team output goal. [budget difficulty]
It was difficult to meet the team output goal. [budget difficulty]
Alternative 1 (sharing keys) in the decoding task can be used to increase the team
output. [Cooperation manipulation check]
8. Alternative 3 (reducing teammate’s final output) in the decoding task can be used to
decrease my teammate’s final output. [Sabotage manipulation check]
9. I know my teammate before today's session.
10. I shared keys with my teammate because my teammate shared keys with me.
[reciprocity-cooperation]
11. I shared keys with my teammate because I thought my teammate would do the same
to me. [reciprocity-cooperation]
12. I did not share keys with my teammate because my teammate did not share keys with
me. [reciprocity – cooperation]
13. I would share keys with my teammate only if my teammate share keys with me.
[reciprocity - cooperation]
14. I allocated points to alternative 3 to reduce my teammate’s final output because I
thought my teammate would do the same to me. [reciprocity-sabotage]
15. I allocated points to alternative 3 to reduce my teammate’s final output because I
knew for sure my teammate reduced my final output and I wanted to retaliate.
[reciprocity-sabotage]
16. I used alternative 3 to reduce my teammate's final output more to retaliate against my
teammate than to win the higher individual bonus. [reciprocity – sabotage]
17. I wasn't certain of what my teammate's decisions were.
18. I shared my keys because I wanted to show my kindness to my teammate and
expected for my teammate to share his/her keys with me. Meanwhile, I reduced my
teammate’s final recorded output because I wanted to win the larger bonus.
19. I shared my keys and reduced my teammate’s final recorded output only because I
wanted to win the larger bonus.
20. I shared keys with my teammate because I wanted to be nice to my teammate.
21. Being an ethical person is more important to me than winning the higher individual
bonus by reducing my teammate's final output. [ethical concern]
22. I did not use alternative 3 to reduce my teammate’s final output because I thought that
was not ethical. [ethical concern]
23. I was trying to win the higher bonus in each round at all cost. [competitiveness – task]
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24. Winning the higher bonus in each round is more important to me than any other
things in the decoding task. [competitiveness – task]
25. I find competitive situations unpleasant. [competitiveness – personality trait]
26. It’s usually not important to me to be the best. [competitiveness – personality trait]
27. I often try to outperform others. [competitiveness – personality trait]
28. I don’t like games that are winner-take-all. [competitiveness – personality trait]
29. I do not feel comfortable about taking chances. [risk aversion – personality trait]
30. I prefer situations that have foreseeable outcomes. [risk aversion – personality trait]
31. Before I make a decision, I like to be absolutely sure how things will turn out. [risk
aversion – personality trait]
32. I avoid situations that have uncertain outcomes. [risk aversion – personality trait]
33. I feel comfortable improvising in new situations. [risk aversion – personality trait]
34. I feel nervous when I have to make decisions in uncertain situations. [risk aversion –
personality trait]
35. The well-being of my co-workers is important to me. [Horizontal collectivism
individualism (H-C) – personality trait]
36. If a co-worker gets a prize, I would feel proud. [Horizontal collectivism individualism
(H-C) – personality trait]
37. If a relative were in financial difficulty, I would help within my means. [Horizontal
collectivism individualism (H-C) – personality trait]
38. It is important to maintain harmony within my group. [Horizontal collectivism
individualism (H-C) – personality trait]
39. I like sharing little things with my neighbors. [Horizontal collectivism individualism
(H-C) – personality trait]
40. I feel good when I cooperate with others. [Horizontal collectivism individualism (HC) – personality trait]
41. My happiness depends very much on the happiness of those around me. [Horizontal
collectivism individualism (H-C) – personality trait]
42. To me, pleasure is spending time with others. [Horizontal collectivism individualism
(H-C) – personality trait]
43. Briefly describe the strategy you used in the decoding task (open question).
44. Please note any part of the instructions you found confusing (open question).
45. Other comments (open question).
Demographic Information (6 questions)
46. Age: _____
47. Gender: _____ Male
_____ Female
48. Race: _____ African American _____ Asian
_____ White/Caucasian

_____ Hispanic/Latino

49. Major: _____
50. Have you taken an ethic class? No _____
Yes _____
51. How many years of professional work experience do you have? ____________
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